Question 1

I. PURPOSE OF VOIR DIRE

Accepted Answer

A. To determine whether prospective juror is qualified and will be completely impartial in his judgment. Barker v. Randolph, 239 So.2d 110 (1st DCA 1970); To obtain fair and impartial jury to try issues in the cause. King v. State, 390 So.2d 315 (1980).
B. “Maintaining the sanctity of the jury trial is both critical and integral to the preservation of a fair and honest judicial system. It is also significant to the trust and confidence our citizens place in the judicial system. ‘The jury is an essential instrumentality—an appendage—of the court, the body ordained to pass upon guilt or innocence.’ [citation omitted]. Without the ‘[e]xercise of calm and informed judgment’ by the jury, we cannot expect ‘proper enforcement of law.’ Id. Consequently, a failure to ensure that our jury panels are comprised of only fair and impartial members renders suspect any verdict reached.” Matarranz v. State, 133 So.3d 473 (2013).
C. &#8220;In this country jury duty is one of the greatest responsibilities incident to citizenship, and it is the rule and policy of the law to secure men for this duty of approved integrity whose minds are wholly free from bias or prejudice either for or against the accused, or for or against either party in a civil case. In making up the panel to serve in any particular case the trial court has an extensive and almost unlimited discretion in discharging any person or persons called to serve on the jury who might in the opinion of the court for any reason not be a suitable person for such service.” Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533 (1923).

Question 2

II.PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Accepted Answer

A. Criminal defendant must be present. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.180(a)4.
B. Court reporter must be present if requested by a party. Loucks v. State, 471 So.2d 131 (4th DCA 1985).
C. Judge must be present during questioning of potential jurors in criminal trial; this requirement may not be waived by anyone, including defendant. State v. Singletary, 549 So.2d 996 (1989); Judge need not be present after questioning where parties informally agree to panel without exercising any peremptory challenges. Ortiz v. State, 655 So.2d 1288 (3rd DCA 1995).
D. In criminal trial, State or defendant may challenge panel on ground that prospective jurors were not selected or drawn according to law; challenge must be made in writing and before any individual juror is examined, unless otherwise ordered by court. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.290.
E. Prior to questioning, prospective jurors must be administered oath: “Do you solemnly, swear (or affirm) that you will answer truthfully all questions asked of you as prospective jurors, so help you God” [if objection by juror, underlined portion may be omitted]; Court decides whether prospective jurors will be sworn collectively or individually. Fla.R.Crim.P 3.300(a).
F. Under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.431(a)l, court may direct clerk to furnish prospective jurors with questionnaire in form approved by Supreme Court (Rules forms 1.983 & 1.984).  Questionnaire:

shall be used after names of jurors selected, but before certification;
shall be used to determine those not qualified under any statutory ground for disqualification;
shall be available for inspection in clerk&#8217;s office, and copies available in court during voir dire for the parties and the Court. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.431(a)2.

G. In criminal cases, upon request, clerk must furnish to parties list of prospective jurors and copies of all questionnaires returned by them. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.281.
H. Must be sufficient space in courtroom for spectators and members of public during voir dire, as with other aspects of trial. Williams v. State, 736 So.2d 699 (4th DCA 1999); Campbell-Eley v. State, 756 So.2d 1043 (4th DCA 2000); If public is excluded from trial, right to public trial is waived unless defendant objects. Alvarez v. State, 827 So.2d 269 (4th DCA 2002). Objection must be specific and contemporaneous; general objection is insufficient to preserve issue for appeal. Mansingh v. State, 68 So.3d 383 (5th DCA 2011).
I. Matters regarding conduct of voir dire are within court&#8217;s discretion and will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. King v. State, 790 So.2d 1253 (5th DCA 2001).
J. Where juror fails to disclose relationship with key witness during voir dire, and relationship is discovered during trial, court has discretion to remove juror and substitute alternate juror in his place. Nicholas v. State, 47 So.3d 297 (2nd DCA 2010).
K. Criminal defendant has due process right to be present at all critical stages of trial, including jury selection. Counsel is cautioned against making off-the-record agreements about selection of jury in criminal case. Hojan v. State, 212 So.3d 982 (2017).
L. No error in removing defendant from courtroom during his criminal trial after repeated disruptive behavior. Bless v. State, 49 FLW D2498 (4th DCA 2024).

Question 3

III. PERSONS DISQUALIFIED TO SERVE

Accepted Answer

A. Prospective jurors are usually questioned about the following in the jury assembly room before they are brought into the courtroom for questioning. You may want to check the procedure in your circuit. The following people are disqualified to serve as jurors, pursuant to F.S. §40.013:

Person under prosecution for crime, or convicted of bribery, forgery, perjury, larceny or any crime that was or would have been a felony in this state, unless restored to civil rights;
Governor, cabinet officer, sheriff or deputy sheriff, municipal police officer, clerk of court, or judge;
Person interested in outcome of trial, but not by reason of fact that state or county or municipal corporation is party and prospective juror is merely a resident or taxpayer.

B. Juror related within 3rd degree to any party should be excused to eliminate any actual or perceived impropriety. Mobil v. Hawkins, 440 So.2d 378 (1st DCA 1983).

Question 4

IV. PERSONS WHO MAY BE EXCUSED UPON REQUEST

Accepted Answer

Pursuant to F.S. §40.013, the following people may be excused upon request:

Expectant mother and any parent who is not employed full time and has custody of child under 6;
Practicing attorney or physician, or physically infirm person, but only upon discretion of judge; 
Person showing hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public necessity (trial judge has discretion to excuse juror for any reason personal to juror that judge deems sufficient, Patrick v. State, 104 So.3d 1046 (2012); 
Person who has served as juror within previous year in county of residence;
Person 70 years of age or older; 
Person with mental illness or physical disability and is incapable of caring for himself/herself;
Any person responsible for the care of a person who because of physical or mental incapacity is incapable of caring for themselves;
Upon request, a full-time student aged 18-21 attending high school or college.

Question 5

V. EXAMINATION BY COURT

Accepted Answer

A. Court may ask questions that it deems necessary. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.431(b).
B. Court may examine each prospective juror individually or collectively. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.300(b).
C. Court may ask all voir dire questions & deny counsel&#8217;s request to conduct the examination, so long as counsel is given opportunity to question prospective jurors at end of Court&#8217;s questioning. Ritter v. Jimenez, 343 So.2d 659 (3rd DCA 1977); see Miller v. State, 785 So.2d 662 (3rd DCA 2001).
D.Court may refuse to allow counsel to ask questions regarding racial prejudice when Court has already examined proposed jurors on that issue. Slaughter v. State, 301 So.2d 762 (1974).
E. Venire must be randomly selected.

Court may not ask for volunteers. Grav v. State, 536 So.2d 363 (4th DCA 1988).
Court may not freely exercise its discretion in selecting names to be placed on venire to serve as jurors; however, counsel who has stood by without objection may not later challenge panel because of that irregularity where counsel had opportunity to object, and no harm has come to the defendant. Peacock v. State, 168 So. 401 (1936).

F. Upon motion of any party, Court must examine prospective jurors to determine whether:

juror related to any party, or attorney of any party, within the 3rd degree;
juror related to person allegedly wronged or injured by the commission of the wrong in subject trial;
juror has any interest in the action;
juror has expressed any opinion or is sensible of any bias or prejudice in the action;
juror is, or has been, employee of any party within 30 days prior to trial. Boca Teeca Corp. v. Palm Beach Countv, 291 So.2d 110 (4th DCA 1974). Fernandez v. Hillsborough Co. School Bd., 824 So.2d 193 (2nd DCA 2002).
If any of these grounds exist, juror should be excused for cause. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.431(c)1.

G. When judge’s comments and questions to venire suggest court’s desired verdict, or create a golden rule violation, fundamental error occurs, requiring new trial. Grigg v. State, 230 So.2d 943 (1st DCA 2017).

Question 6

VI. EXAMINATION BY PARTIES

Accepted Answer

A. Each party has right to examine prospective jurors, either personally, or through attorney. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.300(b); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.431(b); Ritter v. Jimenez, 343 So.2d 659 (3rd DCA 1977).
B. Order of examination and whether it is done collectively or individually is within court’s discretion. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.300(b); Fla.RCiv.P. 1.431(b); Randolph v. State, 562 So.2d 331 (1990); Essix v. State, 347 So.2d 664 (3rd DCA 1977). 
C. “The right to ask potential jurors questions during voir dire about bias remains one of the most important, and often overlooked, protections against jury discrimination.” Reversible error to deny defense counsel’s request to question jurors about bias before excluding them. Irimi v. R.J. Reynolds, 234 So.3d 789 (4th DCA 2018).
D. Even with use of questionnaires, court must permit counsel oral voir dire. Frogel v. Phillip Morris, 305 So.3d 793 (4th DCA 2020).
A. Scope of Examination

Must be limited to matters relating to qualifications or disqualification of prospective jurors. Dicks v. State, 93 So. 137 (1922).
“The extent to which parties may examine prospective jurors on voir dire lies within the trial judge’s discretion.” Purdy v. Gulf Breeze Enterprises, Inc., 403 So.2d 1325 (1981); Carroll v. Dodsworth, 565 So.2d 346 (1st DCA 1990). Limitation on questioning is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Harrison v. State, 172 So.3d 1018 (1st DCA 2015); Mizell v. New Kingsly Beach, Inc., 122 So.2d 225 (1st DCA 1960).
To extent hypothetical questions involve facts of case, they are not allowed during voir dire, but are otherwise permissible. Pait v. State, 112 So.2d 380 (1959); Blevins v. State, 766 So.2d 401 (2nd DCA 2000); Lavado v. State, 492 So.2d 1322 (1986).

Questions incorporating evidence at trial and asking jurors their probable verdict based on that evidence are improper. Tampa Electric Co. v. Bazemore, 96 So. 297 (1923); Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312 (Fla. 1997)
Questions regarding verdict juror would return under given set of circumstances are improper. Smith v. State, 253 So.2d 465 (1st DCA 1971); Headrick v. State, 237 So.2d 555 (2nd DCA 1970).
Hypothetical questions that correctly apply law and that aid in determining whether challenges are proper are permissible. Moore v. State, 939 So.2d 1116 (3rd DCA 2006) (prosecutor used hypothetical situation to illustrate difference between testimonial and physical evidence and asked panel if it would require State to produce specific type of evidence). Pait v. State, 112 So.2d 380 (1959); Geralds v. State, 111 So.3d 778 (Fla. 2010)
Hypothetical questions that do not involve facts of case, and that are designed to determine whether jurors could correctly apply law, are permissible. Infantes v. State, 941 So.2d 432 (3rd DCA 2006); Williams v. State, 931 So.2d 999 (3rd DCA 2006). Not improper to ask juror if her husband became disabled and could no longer run the family business, what would she do with the business? Goutis v. Express Transp., 699 So.2d 757 (4th DCA 1997).
 Attorneys are discouraged from singling out prospective jurors for questioning on complicated and confusing hypotheticals and then using responses as basis for challenge. Doe v. State, 980 So.2d 1102 (4th DCA 2008).

Ethical considerations:

Extra-judicial communication with prospective juror before or during voir dire by attorney or someone acting on attorney’s behalf is not permitted. Fla.R.Prof.Cond. 4-3.5.
Character attacks on opposing attorney or party during voir dire are impermissible and sufficient to warrant mistrial. Kellogg v. State, 761 So.2d 409 (2nd DCA 2000).
Negative inferences about witness are impermissible during voir dire. Carroll v. Dodsworth, 565 So.2d 346 (1st DCA 1990).
 “While it is entirely proper for a lawyer to ask questions that test whether a juror can properly accept physical and testimonial evidence, and a lawyer may inquire into juror bias concerning the defendant’s defense, a lawyer is not permitted to pretry his or her case.” Rivero v. State, 35 So.3d 183 (3rd DCA 2010).

“[P]laintiffs are entitled to question prospective jurors about any financial interest they may have in an insurance company to determine whether they would be biased or prejudiced.” Judge may allow plaintiff’s attorney to ask jurors if they felt there could be relationship between verdict and amount of their insurance premiums; attorney may question jurors about any possible prejudice or bias they may have for or against insurance companies. Purdy v. Gulf Breeze Enterprises, Inc., 403 So.2d 1325 (1981).
Narrow scope &#8211; Judge has duty to limit voir dire so that minds of jurors are not infiltrated by ideas having no proper relation to issues to be determined. Carroll v. Dodsworth, 565 So.2d 346 (1st DCA 1990).

No abuse of discretion in refusing to allow counsel to question potential jurors about their TV habits. McClish v. State, 404 So.2d 144 (5th DCA 1981).
No error in limiting defense counsel&#8217;s questions regarding autopsy photos, where State had already questioned panel extensively on issue. King v. State, 790 So.2d 1253 (5th DCA 2001).

Wide scope &#8211; Scope should be &#8220;so varied and elaborated as the circumstances surrounding the juror under examination in relation to the case on trial would seem to require.” Blevins v. State, 766 So.2d 401 (2nd DCA 2000).

May question prospective jurors about their understanding and opinions related to entrapment defense. Walker v. State, 724 So.2d 1232 (4th DCA 1999).
Abuse of discretion to not permit counsel to ask about non-economic damages. Sisto v. Aetna Casualty & Suretv Co., 689 So.2d 438 (4th DCA 1997).
May question potential jurors about bias for or against insurance companies and their feelings about relationship between verdict size and amount of insurance premiums they would have to pay. Purdy v. Gulf Breeze Enterprises, 403 So.2d 1325 (1981); Sutton v. Gomez, 234 So.2d 725 (2nd DCA 1970).
Questions concerning “insurance crisis&#8221; or “1awsuit crisis&#8221; are allowed. Sutherlin v. Fenenga, 810 P.2d 353 (NM Ct. App. 1991); Babcock v. Northwest Memorial Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1989).
May question prospective jurors about feelings regarding voluntary intoxication defense. Lavado v. State, 492 So.2d 1322 (1986); Morton v. State, 667 So.2d 463 (1st DCA 1996).
Error to prevent counsel from questioning panel about burden of proof, presumption of innocence, and reasonable doubt, even after court conducted brief inquiry on issues. Mendez v. State, 898 So.2d 1141 (5th DCA 2005); Ramirez v. State, 901 So.2d 332 (3rd DCA 2005); Error to prevent defense counsel from asking jurors if they “believe” defendant is innocent. Willoughby v. State, 218 So.3d 935 (4th DCA 2016) .
Error to prevent counsel from questioning panel about possible bias against defendant’s recantation of his confession. Ingrassia v. State, 902 So.2d 357(4th DCA 2005); Perry v. State, 675 So.2d 976 (4th DCA 1996).
Judge “must allow counsel to ascertain latent or concealed prejudgments by prospective jurors”; “precluding defense counsel from individually questioning prospective jurors on critical issues may result in reversal.” Figueroa v. State, 952 So.2d 1238 (3rd DCA 2007); Campbell v. State, 812 So.2d 540 (4th DCA 2002).
 Reversible error to prohibit counsel from questioning jurors about “core issues to be decided by jury”. Carver v. Neidermayer, 920 So.2d 123 (4th DCA 2006); Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553 (1985). Counsel is permitted to ask jurors opinions about particular theory of case. Barnhill v. State, 834 So.2d 836 (2002).
 Reversible error to prohibit defense counsel from questioning jurors about attitudes regarding entrapment defense. Harrison v. State, 172 So.2d 1018 (1st DCA 2015); Walker v. State, 724 So.2d 1232 (4th DCA 1999).
 Error for court to prevent counsel from questioning jurors about subjects already covered by court under guise it would be repetitive, because jurors respond differently to lawyers than to judge. Harrison v. State, 172 So.3d 1018 (1st DCA 2015); Ramirez v. State, 901 So.2d 332 (3rd DCA 2005); Carver v. Neidermayer, 920 So.2d 123 (4th DCA 2006); Sanders v. State, 707 So.2d 664 (1998); Miller v. State, 785 So.2d 662 (3rd DCA 2001); Mosely v. State, 842 So.2d 279 (3rd DCA 2003); Figueroa v. State, 952 So.2d 1238 (3rd DCA 2007).
 Counsel may question jurors about opinions formed based on what juror has read and heard about case. Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553 (1985); Boggs v. State, 667 So.2d 765 (1996).
Counsel may inquire about juror’s litigation history and what views they may have in light of that experience. Roberts v. Tejada, 814 So.2d 334 (2002).

Comments intended to curry favor with the jury are unprofessional and not allowed. Bocher v. Glass, 874 So.2d 701 (1st DCA 2004) (During voir dire, counsel made comments that could have only been designed to ingratiate himself to the jurors &#8211; that he has a child the same age as decedent, that he used to play professional football, and that he is a “straight-ahead guy.”  See also Kelley v. Mutnich, 481 So.2d 999 (4th DCA 1986).
 Improper for defense counsel to use “innocent until proven guilty” in describing plaintiff’s burden of proof in negligence case during voir dire. Irizarry v. Moore, 84 So.3d 1069 (5th DCA 2012).
 Improper for counsel to state during voir dire that he is a “consumer justice attorney” who represents “John Hooks, a merchant marine, not some fancy company, not some conglomerate.” Hollenbeck v. Hooks, 993 So.2d 50 (1st DCA 2008).
Where a juror&#8217;s attitude about a particular legal doctrine is essential to a determination of whether challenges for cause or peremptory challenges are to be made, it is well settled that the scope of the voir dire properly includes questions about and references to that legal doctrine. Denial to counsel of the opportunity to question prospective jurors on their ability to follow the law constitutes abuse of discretion and is grounds for a new trial. Boyles v. Dillard’s, 199 So.3d 315 (1st DCA 2016).
Error to prohibit counsel from questioning jurors if they could be fair in murder case in which victim was pregnant and fetus did not survive. Campbell-Eley v. State, 718 So.2d 327 (4th DCA 1998).
Error to prohibit counsel from questioning jurors about whether defendant’s prior felony convictions would sway their decision. Johnson v. State, 590 So.2d 1110 (2nd DCA 1991); Moses v. State, 535 So.2d 350 (4th DCA 1998).
Error to prohibit questions about whether jurors would disregard testimony of witness who had been convicted of crime. Gonzalez v. State, 538 So.2d 1343 (4th DCA 1989).
Error to prohibit questions about jurors’ 1st Amendment beliefs in case involving disorderly conduct charge for shouting in government office. Chandler v. State, 744 So.2d 1058 (4th DCA 1999).
Error to prohibit questions about feelings related to necessity defense. Stevens v. State, 928 So.2d 409 (3rd DCA 2006).
Error to prohibit questions regarding attitudes related to defense of misidentification. Mosely v. State, 842 So.2d 279 (3rd DCA 2003)
Error to prohibit defense counsel in vehicular homicide case from asking “are you open to the theory that an accident can occur involving a death and there be no criminal culpability in that case?” Rivera v. State, 48 FLW D2062
Prosecutor may ask jurors why a victim might not want to prosecute a domestic violence case. Rivera v. State, 718 So.2d 856 (4th DCA 1998) 
Prosecutor in murder case may ask juror if it would bother her that case involved victim with learning disability. Davis v. State, 698 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 1997).
Proper to ask prospective jurors about assumptions concerning testimony of law enforcement officers. Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1997)
It is the defendant’s right, not the prosecutor’s, to first broach with potential jurors the sensitive issue of not testifying; prosecutors are cautioned against commenting during voir dire on a defendant’s right to remain silent or burden to prove innocence. Owens v. State, 50 FLW D847 (5th DCA 2025); Marston v. State, 136 So.3d 563 (Fla. 2014); Varona v. State, 674 So.2d 823 (4th DCA 1996)

B. Time Limitations

&#8220;It is well-settled that trial courts have considerable discretion with regard to the voir dire examination of prospective jurors.” Amount of time allotted for voir dire depends on nature of case and reasonable use by attorneys of time allotted. Appropriateness of time limitation is reviewed on case-by-case basis. Watson v. State, 693 So.2d 69 (2nd DCA 1997); Rodriguez v. State, 675 So.2d 189 (3rd DCA 1996).  Court must give parties reasonable notice of time constraints, but constraints must remain flexible. Carver v. Neidermayer, 920 So.2d 123 (4th DCA 2006); Roberts v. State 937 So.2d 781 (2nd DCA 2006).
Court cannot arbitrarily limit jury selection. Williams v. State, 424 So.2d 148 (5th DCA 1982); Cohn v. Julien, 574 So.2d 1202 (3rd DCA 1991); Miller v. State, 785 So.2d 662 (3rd DCA 2001). “Limits that do not ‘flex with the circumstances’ can result in unreasonable curtailment of counsel’s efforts to obtain a ‘fair and impartial jury to try the issues in the case.’” Hopkins v. State, 223 So. 3d 285 (4th DCA 2017); Perry v. State, 675 So.2d 976 (4th DCA 1996).  No mathematical formula exists, nor should it. Cassaday v. State, 289 So.3d 915 (4th DCA 2020).
Court may impose time limitations, but must not be severe. Francis v. State, 579 So.2d 286 (3rd DCA 1991). Court’s imposition of time limits reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hopkins v. State, 223 So.3d 285 (4th DCA 2017); Court abuses discretion when it imposes unreasonable time limits or limits on the number of questions counsel can ask. Campbell v. State, 812 So.2d 540 (4th DCA 2002).

Reversible error in automobile case where trial judge limited voir dire to total of 15 minutes for both plaintiffs after court conducted short voir dire with 7 general questions. Knapp v. Shores, 550 So.2d 1155 (3rd DCA 1989).
In complex medical malpractice wrongful death case, restricting counsel to 15 minutes for voir dire was unreasonable. Cohn v. Julien, 574 So.2d 1202 (3rd DCA 1991).
Error to limit voir dire to 20 minutes when panel consisted of 29 prospective jurors and charges were robbery & first degree murder of police officer. James v. State, 575 So.2d 335 (3rd DCA 1991); 20 minute limit unreasonable Williams v. State, 424 So.2d 148 (5th DCA 1982).
Error to require lawyer to begin jury selection at 7:30 p.m. after he already sat through two jury selections and had been in court since 8a.m. Ferrer v. State, 718 So.2d 822 (4th DCA 1998).
Error to limit voir dire to 31 minutes. White v. State, 717 So.2d 1055 (3rd DCA 1998).
30-minute limit in aggravated battery, habitual offender case affirmed. Watson v. State, 693 So.2d 69 (2nd DCA 1997); 30-minute limit in grand theft case affirmed. Anderson v. State, 739 So.2d 642 (4th DCA 1999).
Trial court could conduct voir dire and limit counsel&#8217;s questioning to 20 minutes per side in products liability case against window manufacturer. Allen v. Se-Go Industries, Inc., 510 So.2d 1097 (3rd DCA 1987).
Reversible error to limit voir dire to 45 minutes to question panel of 19 potential jurors in personal injury case. Carver v. Neidermayer, 920 So.2d 123 (4th DCA 2006).
Reversible error to limit counsel’s voir dire examination to 1-3 minutes for each potential juror. Gosha v. State, 534 So.2d 912 (3rd DCA 1988); Error to limit questioning to less than 2 minutes per juror. O’Hara v. State, 642 So.2d 592 (3rd DCA 1998).
After limiting counsel to 3 hours to question 50 potential jurors in 1st degree murder case (3.6 minutes per juror), it was abuse of discretion to deny counsel’s request for extra 20 minutes to question 7 remaining jurors he had not yet had time to speak with. Hopkins v. State, 223 So.3d 285 (4th DCA 2017).
 Error to limit defense counsel to 55 minutes for voir dire, when he used time efficiently, asked for more time, and articulated topics he still wished to cover. Strachan v. State, 279 So.3d 1231 (4th DCA 2019).
75 minute time limit to question 40 jurors in sexual battery case was not error. Cassaday v. State, 289 So.3d  915(4th DCA 2020).

Fact that trial judge has questioned jurors before allowing attorneys to question jurors does not, itself, justify limits on counsel’s voir dire. Carver v. Neidermayer, 920 So.2d 123 (4th DCA 2006); Miller v. State, 785 So.2d 662 (3rd DCA 2001).
If court does impose limits on voir dire, it should notify counsel some fair time before trial begins, not during voir dire. Carver v. Neidermayer, 920 So.2d 123 (4th DCA 2006); Rodriguez v. State, 675 So.2d 189 (3rd DCA 1996).
Request for voir dire must be exercised timely.

Where panel has been tendered to other party, whether to reopen voir dire rests in sound discretion of trial court. Mizell v. New Kingsly Beach, Inc., 122 So.2d 225 (1st DCA 1960). “Full exploration of a questionable juror by the party who may be the receiver of the unfairness of the juror should not be denied when his counsel fully and in good faith previously interrogated the panel, but prejudicial information was not forthcoming until his adversary questioned the jury.” Barker v. Randolph, 239 So.2d 110 (1st DCA 1970).
Where defendant refused repeated offers for an attorney to represent him at trial, but after jury was sworn he accepted a public defender, court did not err in denying motion by attorney to be allowed to question jurors. Albright v. State, 191 So.2d 65 (2nd DCA 1966).

To preserve objection to time limit imposed by court, counsel must renew objection when time is up and request additional time. Where judge limited counsel to 1 hour, even though counsel objected to limit before trial, he should have requested more time when judge told him time had expired.  Tallahassee Housing Authority v. Prather, 304 So.3d 403 (1st DCA 2020). 
75 minute time limit in multi-count criminal trial was not abuse of discretion. McMath v. State, 50 FLW D1015 (1st DCA 2025)

Question 7

VII. CHALLENGES IN GENERAL

Accepted Answer

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/fl-district-court-of-appeal/117239743.htmlOn motion of any party, all challenges are to be made out of hearing of panel, so prospective jurors don’t know nature of challenge, party making challenge, or basis of court&#8217;s ruling on challenge, if for cause. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.315; Fla.R.Civ.P 1.431(e).
In criminal case, State or defendant may challenge prospective juror before juror is sworn, but for good cause, court may permit challenge after juror is sworn but before evidence is presented; Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.310; challenge may be oral, but if for cause, ground must be stated. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.320.
Court shall determine validity of challenge for cause, considering the juror challenged and any other material witnesses produced by parties and examined under oath by either party; court may consider any other evidence material to the challenge. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.330; Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.431(c)1.
Backstriking (attempting to strike juror already accepted) prior to jury being sworn is permissible, and court cannot circumvent this by swearing in individual jurors. Aquila v. Brisk Transportation, 170 So.3d 924 (4th DCA 2015);  Hunter v. State, 660 So.2d 244 (1995); Peacher v. Cohn, 786 So.2d 1282 (5th DCA 2001); Gilliam v. State, 514 So.2d 1098 (1987); Szymanski v. Cardiovascular Assoc., 62 So.3d 649 (5th DCA 2011)(court erred in ruling that jury would be sworn piecemeal unless party agreed not to backstrike); State v. Page-Martin, 135 So.3d 491 (2nd DCA 2014). Error to prohibit counsel from using strike after a “double-pass”. Lewis v. State, 593 So.2d 1195 (4th DCA 1992); Van Sickle v. Zimmer, 807 So.2d 182 (2nd DCA 2002); Frederick v. State, 49 FLW D1122 (4th DCA 2024)(error to deny peremptory backstrike before jury was sworn).
Backstriking after jury sworn not permissible. However, similar situation was circumvented by court in Davis v. Sobik&#8217;s Sandwich Shops, 351 So.2d 17 (1977), where court found no error in swearing-in part of jury without allowing parties to exercise remaining peremptory challenges.
Peremptory challenge may be used after one party has finished voir dire, even if challenging party has already indicated its acceptance of panel. Saborit v. Deliford, 312 So.2d 795 (3rd DCA 1975).
Improper for court to require parties to exercise all peremptory challenges simultaneously in writing after all challenges for cause are exercised, and there remain sufficient members of panel to comprise a jury after exhaustion of peremptory challenges. Generally, counsel may alternate in exercise of challenges, but not required. Ter Keurst v. Miami Elevator Co., 486 So.2d 547 (1986).
Rules pertaining to voir dire are same for actual and alternate jurors. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.280(a); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.431(g)1.
Court may not restrict party’s right to challenge any juror, either peremptorily or for cause, prior to jury being sworn. Party may use peremptory strike any time prior to jury being sworn. Lottimer v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 889 So.2d 165 (4th DCA 2004); Ter Keurst v. Miami Elevator Co., 486 So.2d 547 (1986); Gonzalez v. Martinez, 897 So.2d 525 (3rd DCA 2005); Van Sickle v. Zimmer, 807 So.2d 182 (2nd DCA 2002); State v. Page-Martin, 135 So.3d 491 (2nd DCA 2014) (court’s denial of right to challenge any juror prior to time jury is sworn is reversible error, even where initial jury panel is seated and remaining venire has been dismissed). Fla. Rock Ind. v. United Bldg., 408 So.2d 630 (5th DCA 1981); Jackson v. State, 464 So.2d 1181 (1985); McCray v. State, 220 So.3d 1119 (Fla. 2017).
Party does not have right to “unstrike” juror in order to use strike on a different juror, if opponent has made decisions in reliance on strike, but may be allowed in unusual or extenuating circumstances. McCray v. State, 220 So.3d 1119 (Fla. 2017).
Voir dire objections must be renewed immediately before jury is sworn to preserve them for appeal. Gonzalez v. Martinez, 897 So.2d 525 (3rd DCA 2005). See Section XI below.

Right to view panel as a whole before jury is sworn is essential component of right to trial by jury. Tedder v. Video Elec., 491 So.2d 533 (1986); Aquila v. Brisk Transp., 170 So.3d 924 (4th DCA 2015); Dobek v. Ans, 475 So.2d 1266 (4th DCA 1985); Van Sickle v. Zimmer, 807 So.2d 182 (2nd DCA 2002).
Once jury is sworn, but before evidence is presented, peremptory challenge may be granted upon showing of good cause. McCray v. State, 220 So.3d 1119 (Fla. 2017).

Question 8

VIII. CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE

Accepted Answer

A. Standards and General Considerations

&#8220;If there is any reasonable doubt that a prospective juror cannot render a verdict based solely on the evidence submitted and the trial court&#8217;s instruction of the law, he should be excused.” Matarranz v. State, 133 So.3d 473 (2013);   Vega v. State, 182 So.3d 848 (4th DCA 2016); Freeman v. State, 50 So.3d 1163 (2nd DCA 2010); Bell v. Greissman, 902 So.2d 846 (4th DCA 2005); Taylor v. State, 790 So.2d 1188 (3rd DCA 2001); Goldenberg v. Regional Import & Export Trucking Co., 674 So.2d 761 (4th DCA 1996); Kopsho v. State, 959 So.2d 168 (2007); Algie v. Lennar Corp., 969 So.2d 1135 (4th DCA 2007); Croce v. State, 60 So.3d 582 (4th DCA 2011); Algie v. Lennar, 969 So.2d 1135 (4th DCA 2007); Hopkins v. State, 42 FLW D1536 (4th DCA 2017); Tizon v. Royal Caribbean, 645 So.2d 504 (3rd DCA 1994).
Juror should be excused for cause if there is doubt as to juror&#8217;s sense of fairness or mental integrity. Johnson v. Reynolds, 121 So. 793 (1929); City of Live Oak v. Townsend, 567 So.2d 926 (1st DCA 1990). Jurors should “be not only impartial, but beyond even the suspicion of partiality.” O’Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215 (1860).Anything less than impartial jury is equivalent to no jury at all. Citv of Miami v. Cornett, 463 So.2d 399 (3rd DCA 1985).
“Ambiguities or uncertainties about a juror’s impartiality should be resolved in favor of excusing the juror.” Hopkins v. State, 223 So.3d 285 (4th DCA 2017). Juror’s silence in response to general questions to panel is not enough to overcome reasonable doubt. Four Wood Consulting, LLC v. Fyne, 981 So.2d 2 (4th DCA 2007); Caldwell v. State, 50 So.3d 1234 (2nd DCA 2011)
Court should excuse any juror if it is of opinion that juror is not qualified to serve. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.300(c).
“The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the court.” Disla v. Blanco, 129 So.3d 398 (4th DCA 2013); Lopez v. State, 76 So.3d 1068 (4th DCA 2011); Mans v. State, 71 So.3d 167 (3rd DCA 2011); Freeman v. State, 50 So.3d 1163 (2nd DCA 2010); Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88 (2004);  Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629 (1997); Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038 (1984); Kopsho v. State, 959 So.2d 168 (2007); Croce v. State, 60 So.3d 582 (4th DCA 2011); Brown v. State, 728 So.2d 758 (3rd DCA 1999). Test does not require juror to be devoid of preconceived notions or opinions so long as juror can lay them aside and render verdict based on evidence. Embleton v. Senatus, 993 So.2d 593 (4th DCA 2008). Gavin v. State, 259 So.2d 544 (3rd DCA 1972). Test is whether juror possesses state of mind necessary to render verdict in accordance with evidence and not based on preconceived notions. Matarranz v. State, 133 So.3d 473 (2013). Court should “engage in an elegantly simple test:  Would we, if we were in the [movant’s] shoes, want this person to sit in judgment of us?” James v. State, 731 So.2d 781 (3rd DCA 1999).
If court has reasonable doubt as to whether potential juror possesses impartial state of mind, it should excuse juror for cause. Kochalka v. Bourgeois, 162 So.3d 1122 (2nd DCA 2015); Caldwell v. State, 50 So.3d 1234 (2nd DCA 2011); Bigham v. State, 995 So.2d 207 (2008); Moore v. State, 525 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1988). Otherwise, juror should not be excused for cause. Smith v.  State, 699 So.2d 629 (1997). Mere fact that juror gives equivocal responses does not disqualify juror; question is whether juror’s responses were sufficiently equivocal to generate reasonable doubt about fitness as a juror. Kopsho v. State, 959 So.2d 168 (2007); Thomas v. State, 958 So.2d 1047 (2nd DCA 2007); Tabares v. State, 24 So.2d 1205 (3rd DCA 2009); Croce v. State, 60 So.3d 582 (4th DCA 2011).
Close case should be resolved in favor of excusing juror for cause rather than leaving a doubt as to his or her impartiality. Bryant v. State, 765 So.2d 68 (4th DCA 2000); Welch v. State, 189 So.3d 296 (2nd DCA 2016); Vega v. State, 182 So.3d 848 (4th DCA 2016); Kochalka v. Bourgeois, 162 So.3d 1122 (2nd DCA 2015); McKay v. State, 61 So.3d 1178 (3rd DCA 2011); Reyes v. State, 56 So.3d 814 (2nd DCA 2011); Bell v. Greissman, 902 So.2d 846 (4th DCA 2005); Straw v. Associated Doctors, 728 So.2d 354 (5th DCA 1999); Goldenberg v. Regional Import & Export Trucking Co., 674 So.2d 761 (4th DCA 1996); Fazzolari v. City of West Palm Beach, 608 So.2d 927 (4th DCA 1992); Longshore v. Fronrath Chevrolet, 527 So.2d 922 (4th DCA 1988); Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553 (1985); Davis v. State, 656 So.2d 560 (4th DCA 1995); Price v. State, 538 So.2d 486 (3rd DCA 1989); Levy v. Hawk&#8217;s Cay, Inc., 543 So.2d 1299 (3rd DCA 1989); Thomas v. State, 958 So.2d 1047 (2nd DCA 2007); Algie v. Lennar Corp., 969 So.2d 1135 (4th DCA 2007); Sydleman v. Benson, 463 So.2d 533 (4th DCA 1985); Rimes v. State, 993 So.2d 1132 (5th DCA 2008); Pelham v. Walker, 135 So.3d 1114 (2nd DCA 2013); Hamilton v. State, 547 So.2d 630 (1989) (“if error is to be committed, let it be in favor of the absolute impartiality and purity of the juror”); Pacot v. Wheeler, 758 So.2d 1141 (4th DCA 2000); Williams v. State, 638 So.2d 976 (4th DCA 1994).
General bias about particular class of litigation will not, in itself, disqualify juror where it appears bias can be set aside. Fazzolari v. City of West Palm Beach, 608 So.2d 927 (4th DCA 1992). However, such bias may warrant dismissal for cause if juror cannot set it aside. Four Wood Consulting, LLC v. Fyne, 981 So.2d 2 (4th DCA 2007).
Prospective jurors must be emphatic and unequivocal that they will be impartial; statement that they &#8220;would try, but were unsure” sufficient to justify strike for cause. Robinson v. State, 506 So.2d 1070 (5th DCA 1987); Sikes v. Seaboard RR, 487 So.2d 1118 (1st DCA 1986); Plair v. State, 453 So.2d 917 (1st DCA 1984) (“I don’t know, I can try.”); Bell v. State, 870 So.2d 893 (4th DCA 2004) (“I’d try&#8230;I would give it my best shot.”). Persistent equivocation or vacillation concerning feelings about death penalty can supply reasonable doubt about juror’s impartiality, justifying dismissal. Okafor v. State, 225 So.2d 768 (2017).
Even where juror is unequivocal and expresses firm commitment that he will be fair or will try to be fair, if other statements by juror demonstrate bias or prejudice, or cause doubt as to impartiality, juror should be excused for cause; juror&#8217;s assurance that she can be fair is not determinative. Welch v. State, 189 So.3d 296 (2nd DCA 2016); Matarranz v. State, 133 So.3d 473 (2013); Vega v. State, 182 So.3d 848 (4th DCA 2016); Club West v. Tropigas of Florida, 514 So.2d. 426 (3rd DCA 1987); Price v. State, 538 So.2d 486 (3rd DCA 1989); Fazzolari v. City of West Palm Beach, 608 So.2d 927 (4th DCA 1992); Bryant v. State, 656 So.2d 426 (1995); Algie v. Lennar Corp., 969 So.2d 1135 (4th DCA 2007); Pelham v. Walker, 135 So.3d 1114 (2nd DCA 2013); Overton v. State, 801 So.2d 877 (2001); Murphy v. Florida, 421 US 794 (1975); Graham v. State, 470 So.2d 97 (1st DCA 1985); Salgado v. State, 829 So.2d 342 (3rd DCA 2002); Nash v. GM, 734 So.2d 437 (3rd DCA 1999). Bias need not be demonstrated with unmistakable clarity. Chavers v. State, 827 So.2d 279 (4th DCA 2002).
Determination of whether or not to grant challenge for cause is mixed question of law and fact. It is within discretion of trial judge and will not be reversed if there is record support and no manifest error. Welch v. State, 189 So.3d 296 (2nd DCA 2016); Mans v. State, 71 So.3d 167 (3rd DCA 2011); Matarranz v. State, 133 So.3d 473 (2013); Kimbrough v. State, 700 So.2d 634 (1997); Overton v. State, 757 So.2d 537 (3rd DCA 2000); Club West v. Tropigas, 514 So.2d. 426 (3rd DCA 1987); Fazzolari v. City of West Palm Beach, 608 So.2d 927 (4th DCA 1992);  Felton v. State, 949 So.2d 342 (4th DCA 2007); Kopsho v. State, 959 So.2d 168 (2007); James v. State, 741 So.2d 546 (4th DCA 1999). Standard of review for denial of challenge for cause is abuse of discretion. Hopkins v. State, 223 So.2d 285 (4th DCA 2017); Thomas v. State, 958 So.2d 1047 (2nd DCA 2007); Reyes v. State, 56 So.3d 814 (2nd DCA 2011). Trial court has unique vantage point to evaluate jurors’ responses and observe their demeanor, which can’t be discerned from appellate record. Mans v. State, 71 So.3d 167 (3rd DCA 2011); Coe v. State, 100 So.3d 1152 (3rd DCA 2012); Disla v. Blanco, 129 So.3d 398 (4th DCA 2013); Craven v. State, 46 FLW D2339 (1st DCA 2021).
To preserve for appellate review court&#8217;s failure to dismiss juror for cause, party must demonstrate that all peremptory challenges were used, that additional peremptory challenges were requested but denied, and that an objectionable juror was seated; party must also object to jury immediately before it is sworn in order to preserve objections. Greathouse v. State, 48 FLW D1913 (2nd DCA 2023); Matarranz v. State, 133 So.3d 473 (2013); Chattin v. State, 779 So.2d 415 (2nd DCA 2000); Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88 (2004); Dobek v. Ans, 560 So.2d 328 (4th DCA 1990); Jenkins v. Humana of Fla., 553 So.2d 201 (5th DCA 1989); Felton v. State, 949 So.2d 342 (4th DCA 2007); Thomas v. State, 958 So.2d 1047 (2nd DCA 2007); Bevel v. State, 983 So.2d 505 (2008); Reyes v. State, 56 So.3d 814 (2nd DCA 2011); Croce v. State, 60 So.3d 582 (4th DCA 2011); Clark v. State, 190 So.3d 146 (4th DCA 2016); Dardar v. Southard Distributors, 563 So.2d 1112 (2nd DCA 1990); Metro Dade v. Sims Paving, 576 So.2d 766 (3rd DCA 1991); Mendoza v. State, 700 So.2d 670 (Fla. 1997); Pentecost v. State, 545 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1989).
If party seeks reversal based upon argument that it was forced to exhaust peremptory challenges because court wrongly denied challenge for cause, it must be able to identify specific juror it would have struck, and that juror must actually have sat on jury – in other words, error and prejudice must be shown. Greathouse v. State, 48 FLW D1913 (2nd DCA 2023);  Croce v. State, 60 So.3d 582 (4th DCA 2011); Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691 (1990); Griefer v. DePietro, 625 So.2d 1226 (4th DCA 1993); Failure to get ruling from court on the objection constitutes waiver of issue. Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So.3d 593 (2009); objection must then be renewed prior to jury being sworn. Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174 (1993); Sebring Assoc., Ltd. v. Aumann, 673 So.2d 875 (2nd DCA 1996); Boswell v. Statek 92 So.3d 883 (4th DCA 2012); Disla v. Blanco, 129 So.3d 398 (4th DCA 2013). It is error for court to force party to use peremptory challenges on jurors who should have been excused for cause. Bell v. Greissman, 902 So.2d 846 (4th DCA 2005); Mobley v. State, 774 So.2d 782 (2nd DCA 2000); Jefferson v. State, 489 So.2d 211 (3rd DCA 1986); Tenon v. State, 545 So.2d 382 (1st DCA 1989); Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930 (Fla. 2003). Effect of erroneously denied cause challenge in criminal case does not apply with equal force in civil cases. Seadler v. Marina Bay, 48 FLW S259 (2023)(Civil cases apply harmless error analysis)
In criminal case, if State and defendant agree, may waive 6-person jury and proceed with 5; judge must make full personal inquiry of defendant. Blair v. State, 698 So.2d 1210 (1997).
Juror not impartial if one side must overcome a preconceived opinion in order to prevail. Rentas v. State, 43 FLW D129 (4th DCA 2018); Freeman v. State, 50 So.3d 1163(2nd DCA 2010); Reid v. State, 972 So.2d 298 (4th DCA 2008); Hamilton v. State, 547 So.2d 630 (1989); Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553 (1985); Price v. State, 538 So.2d 486 (3rd DCA 1989); Pelham v. Walker, 135 So.3d 1114 (2nd DCA 2013); Hill v. State, 839 So.2d 883 (3rd DCA 2003).
After inquiry into bias in general, judge not required to inquire as to particular bias. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, (1973).
When appellant “claims he was wrongfully forced to exhaust his peremptory challenges because the trial court erroneously denied a cause challenge, both error and prejudice must be established.” Kopsho v. State, 959 So.2d 168 (2007); Tabares v. State, 24 So.3d 1205 (3rd DCA 2009).
Where trial court improperly denies challenge for cause, but grants additional peremptory challenges, error is harmless. “[a] defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice if the trial court grants the same number of additional peremptories as cause challenges that were erroneously denied.” Smith v. State, 28 So.3d 838 (2009), citing Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 97 (2004); Tabares v. State, 24 So.3d 1205 (3rd DCA 2009); Lezcano v. State, 177 So.3d 1024 (3rd DCA 2015). No error to also grant additional peremptory to State. Montgomery v. State, 47 FLW D921 (4th DCA 2022) (Court denied defendant’s cause challenge, but granted additional peremptory to State so challenges would remain equal).
”In evaluating a juror’s qualifications, the trial judge should evaluate all of the questions and answers posed to or received from the juror.” Vega v. State, 182 So.3d 848 (4th DCA 2016); Tabares v. State, 24 So.3d 1205 (3rd DCA 2009); Matarranz v. State, 133 So.3d 473 (2013). Efforts at rehabilitation should be considered in light of what juror freely said before salvage efforts began. Montozzi v. State, 633 So.2d 563 (4th DCA 1994).
Defendant is not obligated to attempt to rehabilitate juror who expresses some form of bias. Caldwell v. State, 50 So.3d 1234 (2nd DCA 2011); Sweeting v. State, 46 So.3d 1217 (4th DCA 2010). However, if juror initially makes statements calling into question his competency to serve but is then successfully rehabilitated, court may deny cause challenge. Mans v. State, 71 So.3d 167 (3rd DCA 2011); Doubts raised by initial answers are not necessarily eliminated by later statement by juror that he can be fair; court must look at entirety of juror’s responses. Lewis v. State, 931 So.2d 1034 (4th DCA 2006); Disla v. Blanco, 129 So.3d 398 (4th DCA 2013); Pelham v. Walker, 135 So.3d 1114 (2nd DCA 2013); Algie v. Lennar Corp., 969 So.2d 1135 (4th DCA 2007). Answers to leading questions from judge should not be sole factor in rehabilitating juror. Hagerman v. State, 613 So.2d 552 (4th DCA 1993); Price v. State, 538 So.2d 486 (3rd DCA 1989).

Once juror expresses misgivings, rehabilitation is generally not possible, as one side must overcome preconceived opinions; Once juror has equivocated, test is whether juror can be fair beyond a reasonable doubt, or juror must be excused for cause. Davis v. State, 656 So.2d 560 (4th DCA 1995); Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553 (1985); Martinez v. State, 795 So.2d 279 (3rd DCA 2001); Brown v. State, 728 So.2d 758 (3rd DCA 1999); Coggins v. State, 677 So.2d 926 (3rd DCA 1996); Tenon v. State, 545 So.2d 382 (1st DCA 1989); Live Oak v. Townsend, 567 So.2d 926 (1st DCA 1990); Somerville v. Ahuja, 902 So.2d 930 (5th DCA 2005).
Error in granting cause challenge is not subject to harmless error analysis (argument that error is harmless because party could have used remaining peremptory challenge to strike juror) because relevant inquiry is whether jury panel as a whole was affected by error, not just whether particular juror was excluded. Blake v. State, 110 So.3d 534 (1st DCA 2013).
Reversible error to deny challenge for cause, thereby forcing party to waste peremptory challenge to remove objectionable juror and forcing him to keep another objectionable juror. Tizon v. Royal Caribbean, 645 So.2d 504 (3rd DCA 1994).
Reversible error to excuse jurors based on answers to written questionnaires without allowing counsel to follow up with oral voir dire. Frogel v. Phillip Morris, 305 So.3d 793 (4th DCA 2020).
American tradition of trial by jury necessarily contemplates impartial jury drawn from cross-section of community. Thiel v. Southern Pacific, 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
U.S. and Fla. constitutions guarantee accused right to impartial jury. Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1959) (if “juror’s conceptions are not fixed and settled, nor warped by prejudice…and [juror’s] mind is open to the impressions it may receive on trial, so as to be convinced according to the law and the testimony, [the juror] is not incompentent.”).

B. Statutory Grounds for Cause Challenges  in Criminal Cases (F.S. §913.03)

Juror is unqualified (see F.S. §40.013 and Sections III and IV above).
Unsound mind.
Conscientious beliefs that preclude juror from finding defendant guilty.
Juror served on grand jury that indicted defendant or on coroner&#8217;s jury that inquired into death of person whose death is subject of indictment or information. 
Juror served on jury formerly sworn to try defendant for same offense.
Juror served on jury that tried another person for offense charged in indictment, information or affidavit.
Juror served on jury in civil action brought against defendant for act charged as an offense.
Juror is adverse party to defendant in civil action or has complained against or been accused by defendant in a criminal prosecution.
Juror is related by blood or marriage within 3rd degree to defendant, attorneys for either party, person alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or person on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted.
Juror has state of mind regarding defendant, case, person alleged to have been injured by offense, or person on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted that will prevent juror from acting impartially, but formation of opinion regarding guilt or innocence of defendant is not grounds for challenge if juror can render impartial verdict according to evidence.
Juror was witness at preliminary hearing or before grand jury or will be witness at trial.
Juror is surety on defendant&#8217;s bail bond in the case.

C. Statutory Grounds for Cause Challenges in Civil Cases (Rule 1.431(c))

Juror selected from bystanders or from body of county and not from jury list lawfully selected, and has served as juror in same court within previous year.
Juror lacks knowledge of reading, writing or arithmetic, when such knowledge is required to enable juror to understand evidence.
Any ground listed in Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.431(c)1. (also discussed in Section V, paragraph 6 above).

D. Valid Challenges for Cause

Juror who expresses difficulty with awarding damages for “nonsubstantial” injuries. Goldenberg v. Regional Import & Export, 674 So.2d 761 (4th DCA 1996).
Juror is unable to be impartial regarding death penalty, and clearly expressed opposition to it. Johnson v. State, 696 So.2d 326 (1997); Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239 (1996); Miller v. State, 42 So.3d 204 (2010); Juror had “strong personal belief” against death penalty. Rodgers v. State, 948 So.2d 655 (2006); Juror stated he was unsure if he could vote for death penalty. Okafor v. State, 225 So.3d 768 (2017). Kimbrough v. State, 700 So.2d 634 (1997) (Juror knew two people on death row and expressed uncertainty about ability to be fair and impartial about death penalty). Juror expressed reservations about death penalty Wolf v. State, 50 FLW S170 (2025). 
Juror expresses bias toward police officer and states that officer’s testimony is worthy of more credibility than civilian witness. Vega v. State, 182 So.3d 848 (4th DCA 2016); Polite v. State, 754 So.2d 859 (3rd DCA 2000); Duncan v. State, 588 So.2d 50 (3rd DCA 1991); Rimes v. State, 993 So.2d 1132 (5th DCA 2008); Ibarrondo v. State, 1 So.3d 226 (5th DCA 2008); Rodriguez v. State, 226 So.3d 833 (2nd DCA 2017).
Juror is biased in favor of women. Davis v. State, 656 So.2d 560 (4th DCA 1995).
Juror expresses belief that victim would only tell the truth. Coney v. State, 643 So.2d 654 (3rd DCA 1994).
Juror owns stock in defendant corporation and is happy with the company. Club West v. Tropigas, 514 So.2d 426 (3rd DCA 1987).
Juror works at hospital where defendant doctor was president and chief of staff. Martin v. State Farm, 392 So.2d 11 (5th DCA 1980).
Juror expresses negative attitudes toward legal system resulting from unfavorable experiences due to lawsuits filed against him or family, and such predispositions would result in bias. Levy v. Hawk’s Cay, 543 So.2d 1299 (3rd DCA 1989); Juror’s wife had been through similar experience, which “would cloud my judgment”. Hall v. State, 682 So.2d 208 (3rd DCA 1996); Juror’s sisters had been through similar experience and was upset it allegedly happened to others in present case. Bryant v. State, 765 So.2d 68 (4th DCA 2000).
Juror expresses reservations about awarding money for death of loved one, and has general disapproval of personal injury lawsuits. Nash v. GM, 734 So.2d 437 (3rd DCA 1999).
Juror is friend of attorney in case. Sikes v. Seaboard Coastline RR Co., 487 So.2d 1118 (1st DCA 1986).
Juror had close relationship with defendant corporation and initially stated she would try to be impartial, but later stated she could be fair. Longshore v. Fronrath Chevrolet, 527 So.2d 922 (4th DCA 1988).
Juror failed to reveal prior arrests and expressed trauma over being victim of home invasion. Still v. State, 917 So.2d 250 (3rd DCA 2005).
Juror admitted predisposition for plaintiff. Weinstein Design v. Fielder, 884 So.2d 990 (4th DCA 2004).
Juror expressed negative opinions about lawsuits against health care providers. Somerville v. Ahuja, 902 So.2d 930 (5th DCA 2005).
Juror expressed distaste for lawyers, said he would hold plaintiff to higher standard of proof, said plaintiffs are looking for easy money, trying to cheat the system and make an easy buck, and agreed that plaintiff would have to overcome his resistance. Frazier v. Wesch, 913 So.2d 1216 (4th DCA 2005); Juror had animosity toward criminal defense attorneys, blaming them for society’s ills. James v. State, 731 So.2d 781 (3rd DCA 1999).
In criminal case, juror expressed belief that law should require defendant to testify, and he was not sure if he could set that aside while deliberating. Juror’s equivocal responses raised reasonable doubt and he should have been excused for cause. Kopsho v. State, 959 So.2d 168 (2007); juror who states that criminal defendant’s failure to testify would influence his/her decision should be excused for cause. Caldwell v. State, 50 So.3d 1234 (2nd DCA 2011); Sweeting v. State,46 So.3d 1217 (4th DCA 2010); Overton v. State, 801 So.2d 877 (2001); Mitchell v. State, 862 So.2d 908 (4th DCA 2003); 2 jurors who stated they might be influenced by defendant’s failure to testify should have been excused for cause. Hopkins v. State, 223 So.3d 285 (4th DCA 2017).
After jury was sworn, juror revealed that she had twice been victim of burglary, same crime with which defendant was charged. Juror should have been excused and mistrial declared. Garrido v. State, 955 So.2d 1195 (3rd DCA 2007). However, being the victim of a burglary, without more, is not grounds for a cause challenge, even in prosecution for burglary. Rivero v. State, 35 So.3d 183 (3rd DCA 2010).
Juror expressed doubt about ability to recommend death sentence in capital murder case. Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938 (2007).
Juror expressed doubt that she could be fair and impartial and that she might not be able to decide case solely on the evidence presented. Lowry v. State, 963 So.2d 321 (5th DCA 2007); Mobley v. State, 774 So.2d 782 (2nd DCA 2000) (juror could not be 100% fair because she might be related to victim’s family).
Juror who had negative feelings from her own previous lawsuit should have been dismissed for cause. Four Wood Consulting v. Fyne, 981 So.2d 2 (4th DCA 2007).
Juror expressed belief that he would give testimony of police officer more weight and that it would carry greater credibility than testimony of lay person; error to deny challenge for cause. Slater v. State, 910 So.2d 347 (4th DCA 2005); Taylor v. State, 796 So.2d 570 (2nd DCA 2001) (juror expressed “second thoughts” about giving police and defendant equal consideration); Garcia v. State, 805 So.2d 827 (2nd DCA 2001).
Juror who indicated that in every slip and fall, the person who falls is at least partially to blame and this would factor into juror’s decision and be something the plaintiff would have to overcome, should have been excused for cause. Algie v. Lennar Corp., 969 So.2d 1135 (4th DCA 2007).
In criminal case, juror stated that he would tend to favor police officers, especially when alcohol was involved. Reid v. State, 972 So.2d 298 (4th DCA 2008); Juede v. State, 837 So.2d 1114 (4th DCA 2003) (juror’s silence in response to question is not sufficient rehabilitation to overcome reasonable doubt).
In automobile crash case, juror who expressed negative feelings about prior claim against his wife, and juror who indicated that his feelings about limits on damages may influence his verdict, should have been excused for cause, even though he said “I’m going to be in the middle”. Rodriguez v. Lagomasino, 972 So.2d 1050 (3rd DCA 2008).
 Jurors were not proficient in English and expressed difficulty understanding the proceedings; although court could appoint interpreter for trial, interpreter could not be in jury room for deliberations; no error to excuse jurors for cause. Woodel v. State, 985 So.2d 524 (2008); Pagan v. State, 29 So.3d 938 (Fla. 2009).
Juror who repeatedly stated that defendant went into trial with a presumption of guilt should have been excused for cause. Joseph v. State, 983 So.2d 781 (4th DCA 2008); juror expressed doubt about ability to presume defendant innocent. Marquez v. State, 721 So.2d 1206 (3rd DCA 1998); Kerestesky v. State, 760 So.2d 989 (2nd DCA 2000).
In death penalty case, juror indicated that as a Christian, she could not sit in judgment of others, her experience would prevent her from being impartial, she would prefer to recommend a life sentence, and she would try to follow the law. Bigham v. State, 995 So.2d 207 (2008).
Juror’s refusal to consider remorse as a mitigator could be valid basis for cause challenge. Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536 (2009).
Juror stated that defendant “probably did it”; he followed case closely in the news and provided updates to co-workers, and he changed his behavior toward his daughter based on events in the case. Smith v. State, 28 So.3d 838 (2009).
In prosecution for murder of child, juror previously testified in his own daughter’s murder trial, and found the experience very painful. Although juror said he could be fair, court held “we cannot accept that a parent who testified as a witness during his own daughter’s murder trial could not be influenced, albeit unintentionally, by such a painful and tragic experience. Smith v. State, 28 So.3d 838 (2009).
Jurors stated they may have hard time believing defendant if he testifies, that defendant must have done something wrong to be on trial, and they may not be able to presume him innocent, should have been excused for cause. Tabares v. State, 24 So.3d 1205 (3rd DCA 2009).
Juror’s child was recently murdered, her husband was retired police officer, and her daughter was military police officer for 5 years. Tatman v. Space Coast Kennel Club, 27 So.3d 108 (5th DCA 2009).
Juror, who made it clear that although she knew what was expected of her, she wasn’t sure she could be fair and impartial and follow the court’s instructions, should have been excused for cause. Juror’s mere acquiescence or silence will not erase reasonable doubt created by prior equivocal answers. Diaz v. State, 45 So.3d 32 (4th DCA 2010).
In medical malpractice case, juror worked as investigator for law firm that defended malpractice cases, he expressed opinion that damage awards should be capped and that his beliefs would probably interfere with his obligations as juror. Bell v. Greissman, 902 So.2d 846 (4th DCA 2005). Rodriguez v. Lagomasino, 972 So.2d 1050 (3rd DCA 2008).
In criminal case, where juror had several relatives in law enforcement and said she would possibly give more credibility to police officer, juror should have been excused for cause. Freeman v. State, 50 So.3d 1163 (2nd DCA 2010); Juror had many relationships with U.S. Attorney’s Office and law enforcement. Williams v. State, 638 So.2d 976 (4th DCA 1994).
Juror said it was possible that family history of sex abuse would affect her ability to focus on facts and it would be very difficult to be impartial. Reyes v. State, 56 So.3d 814 (2nd DCA 2011).
Court erred in failing to excuse for cause juror who said he would be more likely to convict if defendant did not testify. McKay v. State, 61 So.3d 1178 (3rd DCA 2011).
 In battery case with self-defense claim, juror who said that a man should never strike a woman under any circumstance should have been excused for cause. Ranglin v. State, 55 So.3d 744 (4th DCA 2011).
 In criminal case, juror had been a rape victim and stated she didn’t know if she could be open minded and expressed some reservations about being able to presume the defendant innocent. Trial court denied cause challenge, which appellate court held was error. Croce v. State, 60 So.3d 582 (4th DCA 2011).
 Juror stated she would hold a grudge against someone who violates the law, but later said she can put her feelings aside, listen to all the evidence, and follow the law. Matarranz v. State, 133 So.3d 473 (3rd DCA 2011).
 Juror who stated she had no faith in jury system and would favor one side over the other should have been excused for cause. Kochalka v. Bourgeois, 162 So.3d 1122 (2nd DCA 2015).
Juror stated she was defense-oriented and expressed concern with awarding noneconomic damages, suggesting that defense would be starting with advantage. Pelham v. Walker, 135 So.3d 1114 (2nd DCA 2013).
 Jurors who made statements suggesting that defendant’s refusal to testify might affect their decisions should have been excused for cause. Welch v. State, 189 So.3d 296 (2nd DCA 2016).
Juror who indicated she would be influenced because her husband was a physician who had been sued and he had undergone and recovered from same surgery plaintiff had should have been excused for cause. Tizon v. Royal Caribbean, 645 So.2d 504 (3rd DCA 1994).
 Juror says one party starts out with a strike or half strike against him/her. Club West v. Tropigas, 514 So.2d. 426 (3rd DCA 1987); Jaffe v. Applebaum, 830 So.2d 136 (4th DCA 2002) (juror said anyone who undergoes elective cosmetic surgery is a fool); Juror says one side starts with “an edge”. Weinstein Design v. Fielder, 884 So.2d 990 (4th DCA 2004).
 Juror expresses a distaste for personal injury lawsuits. Sisto v. Aetna, 689 So.2d 438 (4th DCA 1997).
Juror would have difficulty following law regarding compensation for pain and suffering. Pacot v. Wheeler, 758 So.2d 1141 (4th DCA 2000); Sisto v. Aetna, 689 So.2d 438 (4th DCA 1997); Gootee v. Clevinger, 778 So.2d 1005 (5th DCA 2000); Bell v. Greissman, 902 So.2d 846 (4th DCA 2005).
Juror expressed doubt about ability to be fair; juror will try to be fair but is unsure. Robinson v. State, 506 So.2d 1070 (5th DCA 1987); Gootee v. Clevinger, 778 So.2d 1005 (5th DCA 2000) (juror’s family was treated by defendant doctor, and juror’s mailman was defendant’s dad); juror said she can be fair whether she likes it or not.);  Gill v. State, 683 So.2d 158 (3rd DCA 1996) (“It would be hard for me to say. I would certainly try to be fair.”); Williams v. State, 638 So.2d 976 (4th DCA 1994) (“I would like to think that I could be impartial, but&#8230;I have deep feelings [about the case].”); Juror expressed difficulty being objective. Blye v. State, 566 So.2d 877 (3rd DCA 1990) (“I would have difficulty in being objective&#8230;I am afraid I cannot stay very objective. I think I would try to be objective.”).
Jurors who expressed a reluctance to accept a false confession defense should have been excused for cause. Rentas v. State, 43 FLW D129 (4th DCA 2018).
Juror who said “I am not really positive”, “I really couldn’t say for sure”, and “Yeah, I think so” regarding her ability to set aside her personal experience, should have been excused for cause. Brown v. State, 728 So.2d 758 (3rd DCA 1999).
In prosecution for murder and child abuse, juror expressed doubt about whether his personal experience would influence his verdict; his niece was sexually abused a year earlier, and he was concerned about the young age of victim in case. Wilkins v. State, 607 So.2d 500 (3rd DCA 1992).
Jurors who stated that voluntary intoxication defense was “wrong” and “ridiculous”, and would “possibly” be prejudiced against defendant should have been excused for cause. Ferguson v. State, 693 So.2d 596 (2nd DCA 1997).
Juror who read news article about case and said she was not sure she could be free of its influence should have been excused for cause. Smith v. State, 463 So.2d 542 (5th DCA 1985); Jones v. State, 660 So.2d 291 (2nd DCA 1995).
Juror worked in State Attorney’s Office, knew prosecutor, and stated she could not be fair and impartial. Hagerman v. State, 613 So.2d 552 (4th DCA 1993)
Juror had personal friendship with victim and may be influenced by it. Price v. State, 538 So.2d 486 (3rd DCA 1989). 
Juror was prior burglary victim; defense attorney represented defendant in that case and took juror’s deposition. Canty v. State, 597 So.2d 927 (3rd DCA 1992).
In prosecution for sexual molestation of child, juror stated “I would have to be honest in saying my experience in 35 years in being a social worker, in working with kids, my experience has been that kids don’t lie in instances of child abuse and child sexual abuse.” Juror further stated she strongly agreed that children never lie about sexual abuse and rated strength of her opinion at 9 &#8211; 9.5 out of 10. Juror should have been excused for cause. Campbell v. State, 241 So.3d 877 (4th DCA 2018).
Juror would be influenced by defendant’s prior felony conviction and would not be able to presume him innocent. Burgess v. State, 248 So.3d 131 (4th DCA 2018).
Juror said “I don’t think I could” give fair consideration to insanity defense. Henninger v. State, 251 So.2d 862 (1971).
Juror’s mother was robbery victim, and juror was not sure she could set that aside. Jones v. State, 660 So.2d 291 (2nd DCA 1995). Juror’s wife was crime victim, which “could cloud my judgment.” Hall v. State, 682 So.2d 208 (3rd DCA 1996).
Juror “hoped he could be fair, but&#8230;could not be sure.” Michael v. State, 796 So.2d 1292 (3rd DCA 2001).
Juror lived in county for 33 years “before there was cocaine and drugs and before a lot of Latin people&#8230;took over the area”, he had feelings about that, and probably could not change his cumulative experience or opinions. Farias v. State, 540 So.2d 201 (3rd DCA 1989).
Juror stated she probably was prejudiced but that she probably could be fair. Imbimbo v. State, 555 So.2d 954 (1st DCA 1990).
Juror said he had poor memory and would have difficulty remembering details. Craven v. State, 46 FLW D2339 (1st DCA 2021).
 Juror admitted that upon reading newspaper story about event, she felt defendant was guilty, even though she said she would try to be fair and impartial.” Ortiz v. State, 543 So.2d 377 (3rd DCA 1989).
 Juror in sexual assault case indicated she had concerns about her ability to be fair because of experiences she’s had as a teacher and that she got the “heebie jeebies” when she learned this was a sexual assault case. Error to deny cause challenge. Greathouse v. State, 48 FLW D1913 (2nd DCA 2023)
Jurors were aware of information that court had excluded from trial. Loyd v. State, 48 FLW S221 (Fla. 2023)
Juror in theft case who expressed uncertainty about ability to be fair because he had family members who were robbery victims should have been excused for cause. Sciallo v. State, 49 FLW D1910 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2024)
 No error in removing juror for cause during trial and replacing her with alternate upon learning that juror was not candid in voir dire about prior arrest. State v. Tresvant, 359 So.2d 524 (3rd DCA 1978).
 Juror feels that one side would begin “in the red” or “a little behind,” and juror’s preconceived opinions created a “large barrier” for the party to overcome. Pearson v. Philip Morris USA, 270 So.3d 441 (2nd DCA 2019).
 Juror stated he would give child witness’ testimony greater credibility. Salomon v. State, 50 FLW D978 (4th DCA 2025)
 Juror expressed negative views of insurance companies based on his experience that insurers don’t pay and a case of insured vs. insurer is like David vs. Goliath. University Property and Casualty v. St. Fleur, 50 FLW D2624 (4th DCA 2025).

E. Invalid Challenges for Cause

Juror indicated bias in favor of police officers, but later stated unequivocally that she would not give officer’s testimony more weight and would evaluate case based on evidence. Whitby v. State, 933 So.2d 557 (3rd DCA 2006). Juror’s inclination to believe police officers or those connect to legal process more than other witnesses does not necessarily form basis to dismiss for cause. Massad v. State, 703 So.2d 1134 (5th DCA 1997). Juror expressed preconceptions about police arrests based on his prior police work but stated he could set preconceptions aside, follow judge’s instructions, and would not give police officer’s testimony benefit of doubt just because witness was officer. James v. State, 741 So.2d 546 (4th DCA 1999).
Juror’s son was police officer and case involved crimes in which victim was police officer. Guzman v. State, 934 So.2d 11 (3rd DCA 2006).
Juror would draw unfavorable inference if plaintiff did not attend entire trial. Stockwell v. Drake, 901 So.2d 974 (4th DCA 2005).
Juror admitted “tiny bit” of bias against plaintiffs who are smokers and who sue cardiologists if smoking was partial cause of heart condition, but later denied that she would hold doctor to lesser standard. Somerville v. Ahuja, 902 So.2d 930 (5th DCA 2005).
Prospective juror read newspaper report about case after being instructed not to do so. Turner v. State, 809 So.2d 59 (5th DCA 2002).
Juror spoke Spanish, in case in which Spanish evidence would be presented. Lowry v. State, 963 So.2d 321 (5th DCA 2007).
Juror had vague memory of media report about crime and had attenuated relationship to testifying detective, when juror clearly stated she could be impartial. Kearse v. State, 969 So.2d 976 (2007).
Two jurors were patients of defendant doctor&#8217;s physician expert witness. Sydleman v. Benson, 463 So.2d 533 (4th DCA 1985).
 Juror said he would be biased against defendant if crime was similar to one in which juror’s relative was a victim; once juror learned that defendant’s alleged crime was not similar, he said he could be fair. Joseph v. State, 983 So.2d 781 (4th DCA 2008).
 Juror indicated that drug and alcohol abuse by family members had impacted her life in many ways, she was probation office supervisor for DJJ, and she knew many people in law enforcement, including detective who testified at trial. Hernandez v. State, 4 So.3d 642 (2009).
 Juror expressed belief that death penalty is appropriate for all 1st-degree murder convictions, but then stated that she would consider all the options. Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So.3d 593 (2009).
 Juror heard and read about case 9 years earlier when crime took place, but did not remember details; she stated she “would do my best” to decide case on evidence, she had not formed a “complete” opinion, and stated that defendant should be punished if he was guilty. Samuels v. State, 11 So.3d 413 (4th DCA 2009).
 In murder case, juror’s daughter was recently robbed at gunpoint, but juror stated it won’t affect his ability to be fair. Banks v. State, 46 So.3d 989 (2010).
 When asked if he would let state “get by with a little less proof” because victim was a police officer, juror answered “not really, no”. Answer was not equivocal and did not create reasonable doubt about juror’s impartiality. Levy v. State, 50 So.3d 1218 (4th DCA 2010).
Juror expressed concern that “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden would make it harder to find defendant guilty or not guilty. Trial court properly denied challenge for cause because statement did not indicate bias. Lopez v. State, 76 So.3d 1068 (4th DCA 2011).
 One juror worked for police department that investigated case against defendant. Second juror was retired law enforcement officer, who initially said “I don’t know” if he would listen more closely to police witness, then said he would base it on facts of case. Third juror worked in law enforcement and initially said he would give more credibility to police officers, then said he would follow law, keep open mind, and hold state to its burden. All were challenged for cause, which were denied.  3rd DCA affirmed. Coe v. State, 100 So.3d 1152 (3rd DCA 2012).
 Juror said she could follow law but thought someone not wearing a seatbelt would be negligent. She further stated that percentage of negligence depends on evidence presented at trial. Cause challenge was properly denied. Disla v. Blanco, 129 So.3d 398 (4th DCA 2013).
Juror said he is easily bored and might fall asleep during trial. Another juror said “I think I would be tired.” Guzman v. State, 238 So.3d 146 (2018).
 Law enforcement connection, standing alone, is generally not enough to render potential juror partial to state; juror who worked for State Attorney’s Office 27 years earlier and whose husband currently works for SAO, stated she could be fair, and work experience would not affect her verdict. Cause challenge was properly denied. Williams v. State, 258 So.3d 502 (1st DCA 2018).
Reversible error to excuse jurors based on answers to written questionnaires without allowing counsel to follow up with oral voir dire. Frogel v. Phillip Morris, 305 So.3d 793 (4th DCA 2020).
Jurors said they would relate more closely to plaintiff but had “no doubt” they could be fair. Carrier v. Ramsey, 714 So.2d 657 (5th DCA 1998)

Question 9

IX. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

Accepted Answer

A. Criminal cases (Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.350)

Felonies punishable by death or life imprisonment, each party allowed 10 peremptory challenges.
All other felonies, each party allowed 6 peremptory challenges. (If defendant faces possible life sentence upon conviction of multiple felony counts, but no single count carries a life sentence, then defendant is entitled to only 6 peremptory challenges – Lavalley v. State, 30 So.3d 513 (5th DCA 2009)).
Misdemeanors, each party allowed 3 peremptory challenges.
When codefendants are tried together, each defendant is allowed number of challenges stated above; State is allowed as many challenges as are allowed to all defendants combined.
If multiple counts or charging documents, defendant is allowed number of peremptory challenges that would be permissible in a single case, but judge may grant additional challenges up to the accumulated maximum based upon number of charges or cases if possibility either party may be prejudiced; State and defendant shall be allowed equal number of challenges.
Each party is allowed one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror called.
Judge may exercise discretion to allow additional peremptory challenges when appropriate.
Each side should have equal number of peremptory strikes. St. Paul v. Welsh, 501 So.2d 54 (4th DCA 1987).

B. Civil Cases (Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.431(d))

Each party allowed 3 peremptory challenges.
If number of parties on opposite sides is unequal, each side entitled to same total number of strikes, determined on basis of 3 peremptory challenges for each party on side with the greater number of parties.
Additional challenges accruing to multiple parties on same side shall be divided equally among them, and challenges not capable of equal division shall be exercised separately or jointly as determined by court.

C. Preliminary Considerations

Peremptory strikes may be exercised for any reason or no reason at all. Dorsey v. State, 868 So.2d 1192 (2003).
Purpose of peremptory strike is to eliminate jurors who may be objectionable but who may not be so prejudiced as to warrant dismissal for cause. Meade v. State, 85 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1956).
Trial court has broad discretion over manner in which peremptory challenges are exercised, but must exercise discretion so as not to violate litigant&#8217;s right to make judgment as to exercise of challenges. Right to exercise peremptory challenges is fundamental part of right to fair trial; denial of that right is fundamental error. Peacher v. Cohn, 786 So.2d 1282 (5th DCA 2001).
Trial court has broad discretion in determining propriety of use of a peremptory challenge. Truehill v. State, 211 So.3d 930 (2017); (Poole v. State, 151 So.3d 402 (2014) (noting that trial judge has superior vantage point to observe demeanor of people involved and tone of words used). Trial court’s decision is reviewed on appeal with deferential standard. Spencer v. State, 196 So.3d 400 (2nd DCA 2016); Johnson v. State, 717 So.2d 1057 (1st DCA 1998).
“Discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges based on race or ethnicity violates a defendant’s rights to equal protection and to be tried by an impartial jury under the U.S. and state constitutions.” Poole v. State, 151 So.3d 402 (2014).
“Unstriking” a juror after a party has exhausted all its peremptory strikes and the opposing party has accepted the panel, is generally not permitted, but may be allowed in very rare circumstances. McCray v. State, 220 So.3d 1119 (Fla. 2017); Seadler v. Marina Bay, 48 FLW S259 (2023)
Error to permit party to exercise peremptory strike on alternate juror after evidence has been presented and before closing arguments. Cavanaugh v. Stryker, 308 So.3d 149 (4th DCA 2020) (court found error harmless under circumstances). 
Peremptory challenges are one of the most important rights secured to the accused. McCray v. State, 220 So.3d 1119 (Fla. 2017).
Upon granting additional peremptory to defense after cause challenges had been exhausted by both sides, no error to also grant additional peremptory to State so that challenges would remain equal. Montgomery v. State, 47 FLW D921 (4th DCA 2022).
No error for court to use random number generator to seat first 12 prospective jurors and to replace each juror with next one using number generator. Party has no right to  know identity of replacement juror before exercising peremptory. Paul v. State,  50 FLW D715 (4th DCA 2025) ; see concurring opinion by J. Gooden in Sikes v. R.J. Reynolds, 50 FLW D1097 (3rd DCA 2025), raising concerns about random box method.

D. Limitations

Peremptory challenges may not be used in a discriminatory manner, and are presumed to be exercised in a non-discriminatory manner. Poole v. State, 151 So.3d 402 (2014); Collier v. State, 134 So.3d 1042 (1st DCA 2013); Cook v. State, 104 So.3d 1187 (4th DCA 2012); Strohm v. State, 84 So.3d 1181 (4th DCA 2012); Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (1996), which modified former requirements of State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (1984) and State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (1988); King v. State, 89 So.3d 209 (2012); Johnson v. State, 717 So.2d 1057 (1st DCA 1998). Potential jurors have equal protection right to be free from stereotypical presumptions in voir dire that reflect and reinforce patterns of discrimination. Wimberly v. State, 118 So.3d 816 (4th DCA 2012); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
Current 3-step process as required by Melbourne:

Objecting party must make timely objection on basis of race, gender, or nationality, show proposed juror is member of protected class and request court to ask striking party reason for strike; need only alert court to nature of objection. Garcia v. State, 75 So.3d 871 (3rd DCA 2011); Smith v. State, 1 So.3d 352 (3rd DCA 2009); it is sufficient to show that prospective juror is member of protected group and say &#8220;Objection, I request a race/gender/nationality-neutral reason for the strike.” No magic words required – if court understands nature of objection, court must inquire further; any doubt should be resolved in favor of party challenging the peremptory strike. Streeter v. State, 979 So.2d 428 (3rd DCA 2008); Smith v. State, 1 So.3d 352 (3rd DCA 2009). Court may make inquiry on its own, even if specific basis for objection is not given; if proponent of strike feels objection is misplaced and inquiry is not required, failure to immediately object to inquiry waives any objection to basis of inquiry. Smith v. State, 1 So.3d 352 (3rd DCA 2009).
Proponent of strike must provide a race/gender/nationality-neutral reason where no predominant discriminatory intent is apparent; explanation given must be clear and reasonably specific. American Security v. Hettel, 572 So.2d 1020 (2nd DCA 1991); Tennie v. State, 593 So.2d 1199 (2nd DCA 1992).
If explanation is facially race/gender/nationality-neutral and court decides that given all the surrounding circumstances, the explanation given is not pretext, strike will be sustained; court is not determining that explanation is reasonable; only that it is genuine; essentially, court is making a credibility determination of counsel making the strike. Cook v. State, 104 So.3d 1187 (4th DCA 2012); Julmice v. State, 14 So.3d 1199 (3rd DCA 2009); King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831 (4th DCA 1998); Lidiano v. State, 967 So.2d 972 (3rd DCA 2007); court decides whether to believe or not; need not be objectively reasonable, only truly non-discriminatory, etc. Young v. State, 744 So.2d 1077 (4th DCA 1999); Melendez v. State, 787 So.2d 918 (3rd DCA 2001); Same analysis applies to civil cases. Citv of Miami v. Cornett, 463 So.2d 399 (3rd DCA 1985); Watson v. Gulf Power Co., 695 So.2d 904 (1st DCA 1997); American Security v. Hettel, 572 So.2d 1020 (2nd DCA 1991); for strike to be upheld, court must make finding that reason given is genuine; failure to engage in genuineness inquiry or to make finding about genuineness of strike is reversible error. Lenz v. State, 245 So.3d 795 (4th DCA 2018); West v. State, 168 So.3d 1282 (4th DCA 2015); Denis v. State, 137 So.3d 583 (4th DCA 2014); Cook v. State, 104 So.3d 1187 (4th DCA 2012); Victor v. State, 126 So.3d 1171 (4th DCA 2012); Jones v. State, 93 So.3d 1189 (1st DCA 2012); Garcia v. State, 75 So.3d 871 (3rd DCA 2010); Tetreault v. State, 24 So.3d 1242 (1st DCA 2009); Bellamy v. Crosby, 31 So.3d 895 (1st DCA 2010). “The court should focus on the genuineness of the explanation, not its reasonableness.” King v. State, 89 So.3d 209 (2012); Johnson v. State, 27 So.3d 761 (2nd DCA 2010); there is no requirement that court use the word “genuine” or to orally articulate its analysis or basis for its ruling. Alonzo v. State, 46 So.3d 1081 (3rd DCA 2010); King v. State, 106 So.3d 966 (4th DCA 2013). Belated reasons to support strike, such as supplemental reasons argued the following day, could be considered by court to be less genuine. Poole v. State, 151 So.3d 402 (2014).

The Melbourne analysis was clarified in Spencer v. State, 196 So.3d 400 (2nd DCA 2016), and further clarified in Spencer v. State, 238 So.3d 708 (2018), to describe the 3 steps of Melbourne as actually requiring the trial court to make 3 decisions:

Has opponent of strike properly invoked Melbourne procedure by objecting, demonstrating that juror is in protected class, and requesting neutral reason?
 Has proponent provided a neutral explanation?
 Following neutral explanation by proponent, has opponent established that reason given is a pretext? This step involves the court determining the genuineness of the explanation.

Spencer lays out a clear process to clarify the requirements of Melbourne:

Step 1:

Proponent moves to exercise peremptory strike;
Opponent objects, shows that juror is in protected class, and requests neutral reason for strike;
Court determines if objection sufficient; if so, then

Step 2:

Court asks proponent for neutral reason;
Proponent provides reason;
Opponent is given opportunity to respond;
Court determines if reason is facially neutral; if so, then

Step 3:

Court asks opponent if he wishes to make genuineness objection;
If opponent says yes, he may present reasons to show that stated reason is a pretext;
Proponent is given opportunity to respond;
Court determines if stated reason is genuine, explaining as necessary the basis for the ruling;
If necessary, opponent must ask court to provide any additional finding or clarity to preserve issue for appeal.

4.Failure to specifically assert that strike is pretextual or not genuine waives claim on appeal, even if general objection to strike is made. Gordon v. State, Case No. SC20-284 (2022); Mobley v. State, 100 So.3d 1170 (1st DCA 2012). However, 4th DCA held that general objection is sufficient if it puts court on notice that genuineness of strike is being questioned. Denis v. State, 137 So.3d 583 (4th DCA 2014); Using the word “genuineness” with nothing more is not adequate objection to put trial court on notice that it must make genuineness determination. Ivy v. State, 196 So.3d 394 (2nd DCA 2016); Opponent of strike must make specific objection to proponent’s proffered race-neutral reason, if contested, to preserve claim of error. State v. Johnson, 295 So.3d 710 (2020).
5. If court finds reason given for strike to be pretextual or to demonstrate pattern of discrimination against distinct racial group, court should not allow strike. Sparks v. Allstate Construction, Inc., 16 So.3d 161 (3rd DCA 2009).
6. In step 3 of Melbourne procedure, relevant circumstances for court to consider include: racial make-up of venire, prior strikes exercised against same racial group, strike based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror, or singling out juror for special treatment. Hunter v. State, 225 So.3d 838 (4th DCA 2017); Norona v. State, 137 So.3d 1096 (3rd DCA 2014); King v. State, 106 So.3d 966 (4th DCA 2013); Wynn v. State, 99 So.3d 986 (3rd DCA 2012); Garcia v. State, 75 So.3d 871 (3rd DCA 2011);  Siegel v. State, 68 So.3d 281 (4th DCA 2011); Alonzo v. State, 46 So.3d 1081 (3rd DCA 2010); Julmice v. State, 14 So.3d 1199 (3rd DCA 2009); Young v. State, 744 So.2d 1077 (4th DCA 1999); Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29 (2000). However, “it is improper for the court to consider the overall make-up of the jurors that have been seated in determining the sufficiency of a gender-neutral reason for a peremptory strike.” Johnson v. State, 27 So.3d 761 (2nd DCA 2010)(“gender-neutral justification cannot be inferred from the composition of the panel”). No specific words required by court in step 3 of Melbourne analysis. Bowden v. State, 787 So.2d 185 (1st DCA 2001); Fleming v. State, 825 So.2d 1027 (1st DCA 2002). 
7. “[P]rior strikes exercised against the same racial group are relevant to the genuineness inquiry.” Wimberly v. State, 118 So.3d 816 (4th DCA 2012).
8. Non-exclusive list of factors for court to consider, the presence of any of which will tend to show that proffered reason is a pretext:

alleged group bias not shown to be shared by juror in questions;
 failure to examine juror or perfunctory examination, assuming no meaningful examination by court or opposing counsel;
 singling juror out for special questioning designed to elicit specific response;
 reason for strike is unrelated to facts of case;
 challenge is based on reasons equally applicable to jurors who were not challenged. State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (1988); Landis v. State, 143 So.3d 974 (4th DCA 2014).

9. Court has wide discretion in deciding whether to allow peremptory strike; ruling will stand unless clearly erroneous. Strohm v. State, 84 So.3d 1181 (4th DCA 2012); Files v. State, 613 So.2d 1301 (1992); Bowden v. State, 787 So.2d 185 (1st DCA 2001); Ellis v. State, 152 So.3d 683 (3rd DCA 2014). Standard of review is abuse of discretion. Siegel v. State, 68 So.3d 281 (4th DCA 2011);  Glinton v. State, 956 So.2d 497 (4th DCA 2007); Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597 (2008); Collier v. State, 134 So.3d 1042 (1st DCA 2013); Poole v. State, 151 So.3d 402 (2014); Hunter v. State, 225 So.3d 838 (4th DCA 2017); School Bd. of Broward Co. v. Trintec, 936 So.2d 655 (4th DCA 2006).
10. Party may object to peremptory challenge directed to member of cognizable group, even if party is not a member of the same group. Miller v. State, 636 So.2d 144 (1st DCA 1994); male defendant may object to peremptory challenge of female juror. Welch v. State, 992 So.2d 206 (2008).
11. Court may find otherwise valid race-neutral reason to not be genuine, if counsel does not also strike other jurors who gave similar responses or showed similar demeanor. Ruger v. State, 941 So.2d 1182 (4th DCA 2006); Hoskins v. State, 965 So.2d 1 (2007); Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597 (2008); Hunter v. State, 225 So.3d 838 (4th DCA 2017).
12. If peremptory strike is based on faulty response to complicated or confusing questions, explanation for strike may be considered unreasonable. Doe v. State, 980 So.2d 1102 (4th DCA 2008).
13. Burden of persuasion never leaves the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful discrimination. Mobley v. State, 100 So.3d 1170 (1st DCA 2012); Garcia v. State, 75 So.3d 871 (3rd DCA 2011); Julmice v. State, 14 So.3d 1199 (3rd DCA 2009); Landis v. State, 143 So.3d 974 (4th DCA 2014); Ellis v. State, 152 So.3d 683 (3rd DCA 2014); Johnson v. State, 717 So.2d 1057 (1st DCA 1998). Burden is on opponent to request court to follow Melbourne 3-step process. If court fails to properly follow steps, opponent of strike has obligation to alert court to preserve issue for appeal. Spencer v. State, 196 So.3d 400 (2nd DCA 2016). But see Johnson v. State, (4th DCA 2018) holding that trial judge must always conduct 3 step analysis, whether requested by counsel or not. (“Melbourne imposes a duty on trial courts at Step 3 to request a response to the proffered explanation from the opponent of a peremptory challenge once Step 2 has been completed.”); Hastings v. State, 49 FLW D1128 (4th DCA 2024).
14. Court errs when it requires an inquiry, without establishing that the juror was a member of a cognizable class. Juror’s surname, by itself, is insufficient to establish that juror is member of protected class. Determination of whether juror is member of cognizable class is matter of fact to be decided by judge, but there must be evidence in record to support it.  Smith v. State, 59 So.3d 1107 (2011). Where record fails to identify juror’s race, court cannot determine if pretext exists. King v. State, 89 So.3d 209 (2012).
15.Court errs when it refuses to make proper Melbourne inquiry after party raises proper objection based on a discriminatory use of peremptory challenge. Sabine v. State, 58 So.3d 943 (2nd DCA 2011) (In prosecution for sexual battery on child, State challenged a male juror; defense objected and asked for gender-neutral reason, and court refused to conduct inquiry). Proper remedy when court fails to conduct proper inquiry is to reverse and remand for new trial. Id.; Wynn v. State, 99 So.3d 986 (3rd DCA 2012); King v. State, 106 So.3d 966 (4th DCA 2013); Collier v. State, 134 So.3d 1042 (1st DCA 2013); Ellis v. State, 152 So.3d 683 (3rd DCA 2014); Spencer v. State, 162 So.3d 224 (4th DCA 2015). Guevara v. State, 164 So.3d 1254 (2nd DCA 2015) (error to refuse to require gender-neutral reason for strikes of two male jurors).  Even an inference of discrimination is sufficient to require an inquiry into the reasons for the strike. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005).
16. “’[W]here a gender or race neutral reason was advanced for the strike, the reason advanced is itself reasonable, and the record is devoid of any indication that the trial judge considered the relevant circumstances surrounding the strike in concluding that it was motivated by improper purposes’, an appellate court must conclude that the trial judge failed to adequately engage in the ‘genuineness inquiry’ mandated by Melbourne.” Siegel v. State, 68 So.3d 281 (4th DCA 2011); Collier v. State, 134 So.3d 1042 (1st DCA 2013); Landis v. State, 143 So.3d 974 (4th DCA 2014); Ellis v. State, 152 So.3d 683 (3rd DCA 2014). However, there is no requirement for judge to articulate her thought process on the issue of pretext. Wimberly v. State, 118 So.3d 816 (4th DCA 2012); King v. State, 106 So.3d 966 (4th DCA 2013); Norona v. State, 137 So.3d 1096 (3rd DCA 2014). But, “we emphasize that it is important for trial courts to make an on-the-record genuineness inquiry so as to permit meaningful appellate review.” R.J. Reynolds v. Enochs, 226 So.3d 872 (4th DCA 2017); Court must follow all 3 Melbourne steps and cannot skip step 3 except when requested. Johnson v. State, 43 FLW D1942 (4th DCA 2018).
17.Court’s decision “turns primarily on an assessment of credibility and will be affirmed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.” Harris v. State, 183 So.3d 1086 (4th DCA 2015);  Norona v. State, 137 So.3d 1096 (3rd DCA 2014). Appellate court must defer to trial court’s credibility assessment, but such deference does not require “rubber stamping” a trial court’s ruling that is not supported by the record. Poole v. State, 151 So.3d 402 (2014). Court must determine lawyer’s intent and if lawyer, as officer of court, is concealing improper motive. Court must determine if lawyer is deceiving himself due to subconscious prejudice or worse, is lying to the court. Genuineness is really question of whether lawyer is being disingenuous. Lawyer should not lightly claim that another lawyer’s explanation is pretext. Spencer v. State, 196 So.3d 400 (2nd DCA 2016).
18. Error to allow party to exercise peremptory challenge after jury sworn and evidence is presented. McNeil v. State, 158 So.3d 626 (5th DCA 2014).
19. Disparate questioning of similarly situated jurors can support finding of pretext. Poole v. State, 151 So.3d 402 (2014).
20. In determining if reason for strike is race-neutral and genuine, court is not required to accept proffered reason(s) at face value. Court must examine all circumstances surrounding strike to satisfy itself that strike is not pretext. Landis v. State, 143 So.3d 974 (4th DCA 2014).
21. Once court determines that reason is race, ethnicity or gender-neutral, and then proceeds to evaluate genuineness of reason, court must make inquiry of opponent of strike, who bears burden to demonstrate why reason is not genuine. Landis v. State, 143 So.3d 974 (4th DCA 2014).
22. Juror’s occupation can, in some circumstances, be foundation of genuinely race-neutral reason to support peremptory challenge. Landis v. State, 143 So.3d 974 (4th DCA 2014); Cobb v. State, 825 So.2d 1080 (4th DCA 2002).
23. If there is no timely objection to strike, there is no basis for court to interfere and question the reason for the strike. Portu v. State, 651 So.2d 791 (3rd DCA 1995).
24. It is improper for trial judge to deny peremptory challenge merely because judge disagrees with the reason offered.  Hernandez v. State, 264 So.3d 358 (2nd DCA 2019).

Because right to unfettered exercise of peremptory challenges is essential component of right to trial by jury and is fundamental to American scheme of justice, error in allotting peremptory challenges is grounds for reversal. Grant v. State, 429 So.2d 758 (4th DCA 1983); Funland Park v. Dozier, 151 So.2d 460 (3rd DCA 1963).
Striking entire panel is not only remedy for violation of prohibition against striking juror based on race; seating improperly challenged juror may be appropriate remedy.  Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174 (1993); 
Replacing improperly challenged juror with member of same minority does not cure constitutional infirmity; jurors are not fungible.  Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174 (1993).

E. Protected Categories

Race City of Miami v Cornett, 463 So.2d 399 (3rd DCA 1985), whites constitute a distinct racial group like any other. Melendez v. State, 787 So.2d 918 (3rd DCA 2001); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Nationality/Ethnicity  State v. Alen, 616 So.2d 452 (1993); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (Latinos).
Gender  Sabine v. State, 58 So.3d 943 (2nd DCA 2011); State v. Holiday, 682 So.2d 1092 (1996); Mazzouccolo v. Gardner, 714 So.2d 534 (4th DCA 1998); When defense asked for gender-neutral basis for prosecutor’s peremptory strike of female juror, judge should have questioned reason for strike. Welch v. State, 992 So.2d 206 (2008); Abshire v. State, 642 So.2d 542 (1994) (systematic exclusion of women by prosecutor).
Age age is generally not a protected category; “young adults do not constitute a cognizable class.” Truehill v. State, 211 So.3d 930 (2017).
Religion “Jews are a cognizable class.” Joseph v. State, 636 So.2d 777 (3rd DCA 1994); Pacchiana v. State, 43 FLW D367 (4th DCA 2018) (Improper to strike Jehovah’s Witness solely based on religious affiliation).

E. Valid Race/Gender/Nationality Neutral Grounds for Peremptory Challenge

Impatient juror trying to hurry up the proceedings; relative previously accused of murder. Taylor v. State, 491 So.2d 1150 (4th DCA 1986).
Challenge by prosecutor to minister because people in religious profession are overly sympathetic. McKinnon v. State, 547 So.2d 1254 (4th DCA 1989).
Juror has committed crimes, has criminal record or was recently prosecuted. Smith v. State, 562 So.2d 787 (1st DCA 1990); Files v. State, 613 So.2d 1301 (1992); Miller v. State, 605 So.2d 492 (3rd DCA 1992).
Juror sleeping during jury selection. Davis v. State, 560 So.2d 1346 (3rd DCA 1990); Watson v. State, 841 So.2d 659 (4th DCA 2003); non-record basis for challenge, such as inattentive or sleeping juror, must be observed by trial judge or supported by record. If reason for strike is not observed by judge or supported by record, party objecting to strike must challenge factual basis for the explanation in order to preserve the issue. Harriell v. State, 29 So.3d 372 (4th DCA 2010). If party objecting to strike did not observe non-verbal conduct, she is not required to dispute factual basis. Ivey v. State, 325 So.3d 906 (1st DCA 2017); Travelers v. Gallo, 246 So.3d 560 (5th DCA 2018) (Proponent of strike claimed juror was inattentive during voir dire, but that was disputed by opponent; when nonverbal behavior is disputed, it must be observed by judge or have record support to serve as basis for strike; Otherwise, nonverbal behavior is not proper basis for strike under Step 2 of Melbourne.) (See Section IX, paragraphs G(1)-(6) below).
Juror was ex-sheriff’s investigator and knew a witness. Cure v. State, 564 So.2d 1251 (4th DCA 1990).
Juror knew witness in case. Green v. State, 583 So.2d 647 (1991).
Juror expressed opinion that death penalty has no deterrent effect, and seemed opposed to death penalty. Green v. State, 583 So.2d 647 (1991); Holton v. State, 573 So.2d 284 (1990).
Juror has difficulty reading, hearing or remembering; juror is evasive or is on medication. Stephens v. State, 559 So.2d 687 (1st DCA 1990); Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327 (1st DCA 1990).
Juror is related to defendant or defendant&#8217;s family; or juror was reticent. Lennon v. State, 560 So.2d 308 (1st DCA 1990).
Juror was Catholic psychology teacher and was more liberal than people in other professions. Happ v. State, 596 So.2d 991 (1992).
Juror&#8217;s relative charged with a crime. King v. State, 89 So.3d 209 (2012); Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784 (1992); Allen v. State, 643 So.2d 87 (3rd DCA 1994); Miller v.State, 636 So.2d 144 (1st DCA 1994); Hoskins v. State, 965 So.2d 1 (2007).
Juror could not follow law unless compelled to do so. Foster v. State, 557 So.2d 634 (3rd DCA 1990).
Juror could not sit in judgment of others. Foster v. State, 557 So.2d 634 (3rd DCA 1990); Aguilera v. State, 606 So.2d 1194 (1st DCA 1992).
Juror unable to understand presumption of innocence, and juror&#8217;s sister worked in State Attorney’s Office. McNair v. State, 579 So.2d 264 (2nd DCA 1991).
Juror was sole provider for dependents. Aguilera v. State, 606 So.2d 1194 (1st DCA 1992); Files v. State, 613 So.2d 1301 (1992).
Juror was equivocal in answers. Kramer v. State, 619 So.2d 274 (1993); Williams v. State, 619 So.2d 487 (1st DCA 1993).
Juror did not belong to any religious or civic organizations and expressed no interest in any activity except reading. Mitchell v. State, 622 So.2d 1156 (5th DCA 1993).
Juror had speech impediment. Clayton v. State, 615 So.2d 826 (4th DCA 1993).
Juror&#8217;s relative was law enforcement officer. Russell v. State, 879 So.2d 1261 (3rd DCA 2006); but see Hayes v. State, 45 So.3d 99 (1st DCA 2010) (denial of peremptory challenge affirmed, as no clear error occurred regarding juror who had relatives in law enforcement).
In medical malpractice case, juror was electrical engineering student and member of defendant health plan; juror was hospital employee and had relative who was physician; juror was married to neurologist; all were valid race and ethnic neutral reasons for strikes. Mitchell v. CAC-Ramsay, 719 So.2d 930 (3rd DCA 1998).
Prospective juror recently finished law school and took Bar exam. James v. State, 768 So.2d 1221 (3rd DCA 2000).
Juror’s close friend was killed in trucking accident, and her ex-husband was personal injury attorney. Agro Dist. v. Rowe, 876 So.2d 709 (4th DCA 2004).
Juror said “police officers are trained to lie” and another juror expressed feelings of persecution, harassment and racial profiling by police. Glinton v. State, 956 So.2d 497 (4th DCA 2007).
Juror questioned why State did not seek death penalty and expressed belief that a convicted felon is not a reliable witness. Carrillo v. State, 962 So.2d 1013 (3rd DCA 2007).
Facts that juror’s brothers were alcoholics and that she had friends who were police officers were valid race-neutral reasons for peremptory strike, but in this case were found to be pretextual. Braggs v. State, 13 So.3d 505 (3rd DCA 2009).

Juror was military commander, and victims in case were police officers. Julmice v. State, 14 So.3d 1199 (3rd DCA 2009).
Juror was previously arrested. Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536 (2009).
 Juror was investigator for School Board and may not have been honest about her criminal history. Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536 (2009).
 Juror was single and a renter. Banks v. State, 46 So.3d 989 (2010).
 African-American juror nodded her head and improperly spoke to another African-American juror; court considered diversity of ultimate jury that was selected (which included 5 African-Americans) and concluded that state provided genuine race-neutral reason. Joseph v. Florida, 41 So.3d 307(4th DCA 2010).
Juror was a corrections officer and had family members who were accused of robbery and drug offenses. Alonzo v. State, 46 So.3d 1081 (3rd DCA 2010).
Court erred in conducting inquiry when prosecutor challenged peremptory strike of juror with last name Buchholz. No record evidence that he was member of cognizable class. Juror’s surname, by itself, is insufficient basis for such conclusion. Smith v. State, 59 So.3d 1107 (2011).

In prosecution for soliciting child over internet for sexual activity, defense counsel exercised peremptory strikes on female juror who was school teacher and spent time in chat rooms, and on female juror who had cousin in jail for similar sex crime.  Court denied both challenges, finding them to be pretextual. 4th DCA held both strikes should have been allowed. Siegel v. State, 68 So.3d 281 (4th DCA 2011).
Prior jury service is valid, facially race and gender neutral reason for peremptory challenge. Garcia v. State, 75 So.3d 871 (3rd DCA 2011).
 Juror indicated he could make up his mind without hearing both sides of the evidence, and expressed opinion that children can be influenced by others to make false accusations. Strohm v. State, 84 So.3d 1181 (4th DCA 2012).
 Juror expressed some difficulty understanding English at the word “insanity”.  Wimberly v. State, 118 So.3d 816 (4th DCA 2012).
 Juror was young female; counsel expressed concern that she did not appear strong in her convictions and would be swayed by other jurors. Hayes v. State, 93 So.3d 427 (1st DCA 2012).
 Juror was reluctant to admit that police officers are capable of lying. Wynn v. State, 99 So.3d 986 (3rd DCA 2012).
 In case in which alleged victim had 8 prior felony convictions, and defense was self-defense, court upheld strike by state of juror who expressed opinion that a person who committed a felony in the past is more likely to commit one in the future. Harris v. State, 183 So.3d 1086 (4th DCA 2015).
Juror expressed reservations about following law on use of deadly force, suggesting that he would not require defendant to meet his burden of proof on self-defense claim. Court held this was valid race-neutral reason for strike. Johnson v. State, 181 So.3d 1243 (3rd DCA 2015). 
Juror failed to disclose that she was crime victim. Truehill v. State, 211 So.3d 930 (2017).
Juror was confused by hypothetical question and was familiar with pricing of marijuana. Roberts v. State, 279 So.3d 271 (1st DCA 2019).
Female juror worked as paralegal for law firm. Santiago v. State, 652 So.2d 485 (5th DCA 1995)
Juror employed as aerospace engineer stated she would find defendant not guilty when judge asked venire what verdict should be before hearing any evidence. Dabbs v. State, 2021 Fla.App.LEXIS 14887 (4th DCA 2021)
Juror could not read and may not be able to keep up with written information on charts and complicated scientific evidence. Johnson v. State, 717 So.2d 1057 (1st DCA 1998)
Black juror had prior involvement with criminal justice system, misrepresented prior employment, and testified on behalf of defendant in drug trial. Willacy v. State, 640 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 1994).
Juror watched CSI and other police shows and had favorable opinion of police officers. Hastings v. State, 49 FLW D1128 (4th DCA 2024)(court erred in not conducting proper Melbourne inquiry).
In trial of black man, black juror said he might have trouble imposing death penalty with defendant’s family in courtroom but could follow law and impose death penalty if evidence warranted it. Hudson v. State, 708 So.2d 256 (1998).

G. Valid Race/Gender/Nationality Neutral Grounds for Peremptory Challenge

Inattentive juror (unless confirmed on record by judge). Williams v. State, 547 So.2d 179 (4th DCA 1989).
Juror fails to react emotionally during questioning (unless confirmed on record by judge). Floyd v State, 511 So.2d 762 (3rd DCA 1987).
Juror did not make eye contact with attorney (unless confirmed on record by judge). Warren v. State, 632 So.2d 204 (1st DCA 1994); Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (1991).
Juror was looking down (unless confirmed on record by judge). Shelton v. State, 563 So.2d 820 (4th DCA 1990).
Peremptory challenges based on bare looks and gestures are not acceptable reasons unless actions or demeanor of juror are observed by judge and confirmed by judge on the record. Bernard v. State, 659 So.2d 1346 (5th DCA 1995); Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (1991), Warren v. State, 632 So.2d 204 (1st DCA 1994); Howell v. State, 1 So.3d 322 (3rd DCA 2009).
 Juror non-verbally indicated agreement with other juror who said he would need physical evidence in order to convict, when judge did not see such indication, and there is no record support for it; “potential juror’s nonverbal behavior, the existence of which is disputed by opposing counsel and neither observed by the trial court nor otherwise supported by the record, is not a proper basis to sustain a peremptory challenge as genuinely race-neutral.” Dorsey v. State, 868 So.2d 1192 (2003); Brown v. State, 995 So.2d 1099 (3rd DCA 2008).
Juror more able to identify with defendant, where juror and defendant were same race and close to same age. Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024 (1991); Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597 (2008).
Juror was unmarried renter. Givens v. State, 619 So.2d 500 (1st DCA 1993).
Juror’s occupation or fact that juror lived in high-crime area are not valid reasons to support peremptory challenge, unless relevant to current case. Johnson v. State, 600 So.2d 32 (3rd DCA 1992); Mayes v. State, 550 So.2d 496 (4th DCA 1989).
In case of sexual battery on minor, juror was Brownie and Girl Scout leader 20 years earlier and had talked to girls about strangers; found to be pretextual and gender-biased. Sharp v. State, 789 So.2d 1211 (5th DCA 2001).
Juror was 30 years old and had never been employed. Roundtree v. State, 546 So.2d 1042 (1989).
Presence of other black jurors or women on panel was invalid reason for attempting to strike black juror or woman. Johnson v. State, 600 So.2d 32 (3rd DCA 1992); Hayes v. State, 45 So.3d 99 (1st DCA 2010).
Counsel had “bad vibes” about the juror. Ruger v. State, 941 So.2d 1182 (4th DCA 2006); Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597 (2008) (general “dislike” of juror is not valid race-neutral reason for peremptory strike). Prosecutor “had a bad feeling” and “didn’t get a good feel” for juror – found to be invalid gender-neutral reason Johnson v. State, 27 So.3d 761 (2nd DCA 2010) (“party’s unsupported ‘bad feeling’ about a juror is not a sufficient explanation to rebut the assertion that the strike was motivated by gender”); Johnson v. State, 235 So.3d 1054 (1st DCA 2018).
Juror lived in different neighborhood than where crime occurred, she previously served on a jury, and her nephew was an attorney. Lidiano v. State, 967 So.2d 972 (3rd DCA 2007).  Court found these reasons to be pretextual and not genuine reasons for attempting to strike Hispanic female, where defendant did not also object to other juror with similar background.
Juror lived in county 5 years, while other jurors lived in county longer. Sutton v. State, 976 So.2d 643 (2nd DCA 2008).
Juror was robbery victim. Reason was found not to be genuine. Smith v. State, 1 So.3d 352 (3rd DCA 2009).
In prosecution for rape, juror’s brothers were alcoholics and she had friends who were police officers. Defense counsel’s peremptory strike was denied, as reasons were found to be race-neutral, but not genuine. Braggs v. State, 13 So.3d 505 (3rd DCA 2009).
In slip and fall case involving black plaintiff, defense attorney struck 4 jurors, all of whom were black, on basis that two were bus drivers, one was former police officer, and one was related to police officer; court found strikes to be pretextual and demonstrating pattern of discrimination. Sparks v. Allstate Construction, Inc., 16 So.3d 161 (3rd DCA 2009).

In criminal case, prosecutor struck black juror whose family member had been arrested, but did not strike 2 non-black jurors whose family members had also been arrested. Trial court allowed strike, but appellate court reversed finding that proffered reason for strike was not genuine. Hunter v. State, 225 So.3d 838 (4th DCA 2017).
Juror gave prosecutor “a look” during a break. Ivey v. State, 325 So.2d 906 (1st DCA 2017).
Prosecutor wanted to seat next two jurors. Henry v. State, 724 So.2d 657 (2nd DCA 1999).
Case involved “black on black crime” and juror was African-American. Baber v. State, 776 So.2d 309 (4th DCA 2000).
Juror who reads the Bible, with nothing more, insufficient basis to support peremptory challenge. Haile v. State, 672 So.2d 555 (2nd DCA 1996).
Error to grant state’s peremptory challenge against black juror who said she wanted to be on jury because it would terrify her to be on trial and to not have a jury that looked like her. Mays v. State, 47 FLW D2408 (3rd DCA 2022).
Prosecutor’s explanation that “I preferred other jurors” or “I liked other jurors better” is inadequate. Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174 (1993).

Question 10

X. PRETRIAL PUBLICITY

Accepted Answer

A. Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to question jurors individually about publicity of case. Dippolito v. State, 143 So.3d 1080 (4th DCA 2014).
B. Court should conduct individual and sequestered voir dire when timing and content of pretrial publicity creates probability that jurors have been exposed to prejudicial information that will not be admissible at trial. Bolin v. State, 736 So.2d 1160 (1999); If media reports are not recent or do not convey inadmissible information, individual voir dire is not mandated. Dippolito v. State, 143 So.3d 1080 (4th DCA 2014).
C. Once it is apparent that multiple jurors have been exposed to pretrial publicity, creating danger that one juror’s response can taint entire panel, court should allow individual voir dire. Refusal to do so is error. Dippolito v. State, 143 So.3d 1080 (4th DCA 2014).

Question 11

XI. CHALLENGES TO THE PANEL/VENIRE

Accepted Answer

A. A juror’s expression of an opinion, without more, is ordinarily insufficient to taint entire panel. Morris v. State, 219 So.3d 33 (2017); Hayes v. State, 954 So.2d 1265 (5th DCA 2007). When juror expresses opinion of criminal system, it is usually insufficient to taint venire. Reppert v. State, 86 So.3d 525 (2nd DCA 2012).
B. Trial court’s decision to dismiss venire is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Morris v. State, 219 So.3d 33 (2017); Dippolito v. State, 143 So.3d 1080 (4th DCA 2014); Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536 (2009).
C. In order for statement of one juror to taint panel, juror must mention facts that would otherwise not be presented to jury. Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536 (2009); Morris v. State,  219 So.3d 33 (2017).
D. Defendant’s motion to strike panel should have been granted, where juror indicated in presence of entire panel that she recognized defendant because she was former corrections officer at Marion County Jail. Turner v. State, 51 So.3d 542 (5th DCA 2010). When juror comments on defendant’s criminal history and has some knowledge of defendant, it is abuse of discretion not to strike entire venire. Reppert v. State, 86 So.3d 525 (2nd DCA 2012).
E. Court erred in failing to strike entire panel after one juror mentioned media report that defendant previously tried to kill same victim by poisoning. Because comment is analogous to comments informing jurors of defendant’s criminal history, other pending charges or arrests, comment may have prejudiced entire panel. Dippolito v. State, 143 So.3d 1080 (4th DCA 2014).

Question 12

XII. PRESERVATION OF OBJECTIONS FOR APPEAL

Accepted Answer

A. Where counsel makes contemporaneous objection to court&#8217;s failure to excuse juror for cause during voir dire, objection must be renewed immediately before jury is sworn in order to preserve objection for appeal. Hernandez v. State, 264 So.3d 358 (2nd DCA 2019); Matarranz v. State, 133 So.3d 473 (2013); Carratelli v. State, 961 So.2d 312 (2007); Romero v. State, 105 So.3d 550 (1st DCA 2012); Wallace v. Holidav Isle Resort, 706 So.2d 346 (3rd DCA 1998) (applying to both civil and criminal); Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174 (1993); Mitchell v. State, 620 So.2d 1008 (1993); Hudson v. State, 708 So.2d 256 (1998); Camellon v. State, 741 So.2d 1179 (3rd DCA 1999); Ter Keurst v. Miami Elevator Co., 486 So.2d 547 (1986); Taylor v. Public Health Trust, 546 So.2d 733 (3rd DCA 1989); Melara v. Cicione, 712 So.2d 429 (3rd DCA 1998); Croce v. State, 60 So.3d 582 (4th DCA 2011); Boswell v. Statek, 92 So.3d 883 (4th DCA 2012); Sanchez v. Geico, 278 So.3d 157 (1st DCA 2019).
B. Where party makes timely objection to prejudicial basis of opposing party&#8217;s peremptory strike, and strike is allowed, to preserve issue for appeal, objecting party must renew objection prior to jury being sworn. USAA v. Allen, 17 So.3d 1270 (4th DCA 2009); Mazzouccolo v. Gardner, 714 So.2d 534 (4th DCA 1998); Watson v. Gulf Power Co., 695 So.2d 904 (1st DCA 1997); Glinton v. State, 956 So.2d 497 (4th DCA 2007); Ross v. State, 17 So.3d 717 (4th DCA 2009); Love v. State, 44 So.3d 644 (2nd DCA 2010); Spencer v. State, 162 So.2d 224 (4th DCA 2015).
C. Jury selection issues are “deemed to be waived after acceptance of the jury, unless the objection is renewed, or the jury is accepted subject to an earlier objection.” Hayes v. State, 954 So.2d 1265 (5th DCA 2007); Baccari v. State, 145 So.3d 958 (4th DCA 2014) (even renewing objection shortly after jury is sworn and before opening statements is too late to preserve objection); Salazar v. State, 188 So.3d 799 (2016).
D. If opponent of peremptory strike fails to challenge facts on which strike is based, issue is not preserved for review. Mobley v. State, 100 So.3d 1170 (1st DCA 2012); Doe v. State, 980 So.2d 1102 (4th DCA 2008); Brown v. State, 994 So.2d 1191 (4th DCA 2008); Opponent of strike must make specific objection to proponent’s proffered race-neutral reason, if contested, to preserve claim of error. State v. Johnson, 295 So.3d 710 (2020).
E. “Unless trial counsel objects with specific grounds when the trial court excludes a juror for cause, review of the trial court’s decision is procedurally barred on appeal.” Deparvine v. State, 995 So.2d 351 (2008).
F. Failure to raise specific ground for cause challenge waives issue for appeal.  Embleton v. Senatus, 993 So.2d 593 (4th DCA 2008).
G. To preserve claim that court erred in ruling that juror’s refusal to consider remorse as mitigator could not serve as basis for cause challenge, counsel had to question venire about   whether they could consider remorse as mitigator and then challenge for cause those who could not. Failure to question   venire about it waived the claim. Orme v. State, 25 So.3d 536 (2009).
H. Claim of error in denial of motion to strike venire is waived if objection is not renewed before jury is sworn. Johnson v. State, 141 So.3d 698 (1st DCA 2014).
I. Errors in jury selection are per se errors, are not subject to harmful error analysis, and require new trial when it is shown that error occurred. Kochalka v. Bourgeois, 162 So.3d 1122 (2nd DCA 2015).
J. To preserve issue of court’s prohibition against backstriking, objecting party must request opportunity to backstrike and must identify specific juror to be struck. Objection must also be renewed immediately before jury is sworn. Failure to do so waives the issue for appeal. Aquila v. Brisk Transportation, 170 So.3d 924 (4th DCA 2015).
K. To preserve objection, counsel must renew specific objection before jury is sworn; raising a “continuing objection” is not sufficient and does not preserve issue for appeal.  State v. Ivey, 285 So.3d 281 (2019).
L. To preserve for appellate review challenge to trial court’s jury selection method as it pertains to use of peremptory challenges, party must exhaust peremptory challenges, identify objectionable juror still on jury panel, request and be denied additional peremptory, and object to panel before jury is sworn. Sikes v. R.J. Reynolds, 50 FLW D1097 (3rd DCA 2025); Lowery v. State, 51 FLW D608 (3rd DCA 2026).

Question 13

XIII. OATH OF JURORS

Accepted Answer

In criminal cases, once jurors and alternates have been selected, they must be sworn in by oath found in Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.360; No one shall be sworn in as juror until jury is accepted by parties or all challenges are exhausted. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.431(f).

Question 14

XIV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

Accepted Answer

Counsel’s alleged failure to exercise cause or peremptory challenge is subject to prejudice standard as set forth in Carratelli v. State, 961 So.2d 312 (2007). For defendant to be entitled to relief on ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must demonstrate that juror was biased against defendant and that counsel failed to strike the juror; evidence of bias must be plain on the face of the record, . Troy v. State, 57 So.3d 828 (2011).

Question 15

XV. JUROR MISCONDUCT

Accepted Answer

A. To support claim of juror’s failure to disclose information, the complaining party must show 1) information is relevant and material to jury service in the case; 2) juror concealed information during questioning, and 3) failure to disclose was not attributable to complaining party’s lack of diligence. Braddy v. State, 219 So.3d 803 (2017); Children’s Medical Center v. Kim, 221 So.3d 664 (4th DCA 2017); De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1995); Young v. State, 720 So.2d 1101 (1st DCA 1998). Moving party must advance sworn allegations that, if true, would justify new trial. Parra v. Cruz, 59 So.3d 211 (3rd DCA 2011).
B. Jurors have duty to give full and truthful answers; juror’s concealment or nondisclosure of material information may deprive party of right to exercise challenge. Smiley v. McCallister, 451 So.2d 977 (4th DCA 1984); Young v. State, 720 So.2d 1101 (1st DCA 1998). Young v. State, 720 So.2d 1101 (1st DCA 1998).
C. Party may be entitled to conduct post trial juror interview when there is reasonable basis to believe juror concealed material fact. Sterling v. Feldbam, 980 So.2d 596 (4th DCA 2008).
D. Post-trial interviews are disfavored and should be rarely granted; sanctity of jury process and privacy of jurors should be closely guarded. Schmitz v. SABTC Townhouse, 537 So.2d 130 (5th DCA 1988).
E. Juror’s non-disclosure is material if, had facts been known, party would have used challenge on juror. Murphy v. Hurst, 881 So.2d 1157 (5th DCA 2004); James v. State, 751 So.2d 682 (5th DCA 2000); Bernal v. Lipp, 580 So.2d 315 (3rd DCA 1991); Indus. Fire & Casualty v. Wilson, 537 So.2d 1100 (3rd DCA 1999).
F. Where counsel clearly asked for information that was not provided, info was concealed by juror. McCauslin v. O’Connor, 985 So.2d 558 (5th DCA 2008).
G. Where juror’s response is ambiguous, counsel must follow up to clarify ambiguity, or answer will not be considered concealment. Tran v. Smith, 823 So.2d 210 (5th DCA 2002); McCauslin v. O’Connor, 985 So.2d 558 (5th DCA 2008). Counsel is not required to conduct background research on jurors. Kelly v. Community Hospital, 818 So.2d 469 (Fla. 2002).
H. Reviewing court should consider dynamics and context of entire process to determine if concealment occurred. Roberts v. Tejada, 814 So.2d 334 (Fla. 2002).
I. General allegation that jurors failed to disclose prior litigation history is not grounds for post-trial interview, unless moving party can show that such history was directly relevant to juror’s ability to serve in this case. Parra v. Cruz, 59 So.3d 211 (3rd DCA 2011).
J. Mistrial is required when alternate juror is present during jury deliberations. Tello-Lugo v. State, 47 So.3d 968 (2nd DCA 2010).
K. Where juror disclosed his own pending car accident claim in written questionnaire but not during oral questioning, he adequately disclosed information. Counsel’s failure to review questionnaire or to question juror about it is lack of diligence by counsel, not misconduct by juror. Farrell v. Chartock, 50 FLW D1797 (4th DCA 2025)

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